NOUA ORDINE MONDIALĂ, aşa cum o vede Henry Kissinger – 31 august 2014
Gheorghe Gradinaru
„Căutarea unei ordini mondiale în era contemporană va necesita o strategie coerentă, care să stabilească o ordine în interiorul diferitelor regiuni şi să facă aceste ordini să relaţioneze între ele. Acestea nu sunt neapărat compatibile una cu cealaltă. Triumful unei mişcări radicale poate aduce ordine într-o regiune şi instabilitate în toate celelalte. Dominaţia militară dintr-o singură ţară, chiar şi atunci când aduce aparenţa unei ordini, poate produce o criză în tot restul lumii. O ordine mondială în care statele să îşi afirme demnitatea şi guvernanţa participativă şi să colaboreze la nivel internaţional după reguli prestabilite, trebuie să fie speranţa şi sursa noastră de inspiraţie. Dar progresul înspre acest scop trebuie susţinut printr-o serie de stadii intermediare”, spune Henry Kissinger.
Conceptul de ordine mondială, aşa cum este el cunoscut în
epoca modernă, este în criză, avertizează Henry Kissinger, fostul secretar de
stat american din timpul...
caleaeuropeana.ro
Paul
Joseph Watson | Moscow's refusal to acquiesce...
infowars.com
V.S I-a scapat vrabiuta
: Rusia a tradat noua ordine mondiala.
Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and ongoing intimidation of Ukraine appears to mean the
end of a...
project-syndicate.org
Un
Prospectiv
.
S-o luam cu inceputul. Sunt sigur ca textul lui
Kissinger e unul important, chiar cu sau mai ales din cauza contradictiilor ce
le contine. Care contradictii nu-s de rezolvat decat daca cei mici accepta
principiul raului mai mic.
Hill vorbeste si el de undeva. Rusia a intrat in sistemul mondial, cel mai probabil, in urma unui aranjament. Nu cred ca asemenea aranjamente sunt aidoma casatoriei catolice, nu sunt vesnice si se desfac dintr-o parte sau alta. A numi actiunea unei parti tradare este o figura de stil.
As avertiza totusi asupra acestor figuri de stil, ele sunt substitute pentru argumente/analiza.
Hill vorbeste si el de undeva. Rusia a intrat in sistemul mondial, cel mai probabil, in urma unui aranjament. Nu cred ca asemenea aranjamente sunt aidoma casatoriei catolice, nu sunt vesnice si se desfac dintr-o parte sau alta. A numi actiunea unei parti tradare este o figura de stil.
As avertiza totusi asupra acestor figuri de stil, ele sunt substitute pentru argumente/analiza.
Adrian
Severin
Am
constatat în timp că opiniile dlui Kissinger, pe care l-am cunoscut și cu care
am conversat în mai multe rânduri, coincid aproape până la identitate cu
opiniile mele. Lucrul se repetă, pare-se, și acum.
De ani de zile susțin (eseurile publicate de mine și conferințele sau discursurile parlamentare ținute de mine în ultimii ani sunt dovada): că pseudo-ordinea unipolară consecutivă Războiului Rece s-a bazat exclusiv pe valorile și modelele occidentale la care nu toată omenirea a achiesat; că în lipsa unor structuri politice transnaționale care să civilizeze globalizarea aceasta va lucra împotriva popoarelor producând inechitate și insecuritate; că este necesară o nouă ordine a sintezei sau a includerii culturale; că dogma exportului valorilor este doar o formă de neo-imperialism păgubos atâta timp cât nu se asociază cu o adevărată strategie bazată pe interesele geo-politice ale națiunilor și pe conceptul "securității indivizibile"; că integrarea regională și apariția unor centre de iradiere care să adune națiunile pe temelia comunității de valori și aspirații sunt premisele unei necesare noi ordini internaționale a globalismului multipolar; că această nouă ordine nu poate fi decât consensuală și că stabilitatea securității ei dinamice poate fi garantată doar prin simetria polilor de putere care să realizeze echilibrele globale prin contraponderi. Cam asta o spune azi dl Kissinger. Poate pe dânsul îl vor asculta mai mulți.
Cât despre "trădarea Rusiei", personal cred că situația este exact inversă. Rusia a fost trădată de ordinea post-bipolară. Încă în 1998 am scris (și am reluat ideea de mai multe ori) că Rusia a acceptat dezmembrarea imperiului sovietic și a dat lovitura de grație URSS numai contra promisiunii / așteptării de a fi integrată ca putere de prim rang în noua ordinea globală, subânțelegându-se că va fi co-proiectant și co-fondator al acelei ordini. Ceea ce i s-a oferit a fost "dreptul" de a ocupa o strană în catedrala puterii globale proiectată unilateral de Occident - așa cum însuși dl Kissinger o spune. "Rebeliunea" rusă împotriva acestei stări era, deci, logică și așteptată.
A recunoaște o atare realitate nu înseamnă nici a fi simpatizantul Rusiei nici a simpatiza cu viziunea sa asupra ordinii mondiale. Înseamnă doar a defini corect o problemă de rezolvat. Unii, chiar în aceste zile, vor să o rezolve prin război (pentru orice eventualitate punând răspunderea provocării războiului pe umerii Rusiei). Alții vor să o rezolve prin mijloace politice pașnice. Popoarele trebuie să fie conștiente de alternativă și să își exprime opțiunea. Dacă nu o vor face ele, cu siguranță o vor face alții pentru ele.
De ani de zile susțin (eseurile publicate de mine și conferințele sau discursurile parlamentare ținute de mine în ultimii ani sunt dovada): că pseudo-ordinea unipolară consecutivă Războiului Rece s-a bazat exclusiv pe valorile și modelele occidentale la care nu toată omenirea a achiesat; că în lipsa unor structuri politice transnaționale care să civilizeze globalizarea aceasta va lucra împotriva popoarelor producând inechitate și insecuritate; că este necesară o nouă ordine a sintezei sau a includerii culturale; că dogma exportului valorilor este doar o formă de neo-imperialism păgubos atâta timp cât nu se asociază cu o adevărată strategie bazată pe interesele geo-politice ale națiunilor și pe conceptul "securității indivizibile"; că integrarea regională și apariția unor centre de iradiere care să adune națiunile pe temelia comunității de valori și aspirații sunt premisele unei necesare noi ordini internaționale a globalismului multipolar; că această nouă ordine nu poate fi decât consensuală și că stabilitatea securității ei dinamice poate fi garantată doar prin simetria polilor de putere care să realizeze echilibrele globale prin contraponderi. Cam asta o spune azi dl Kissinger. Poate pe dânsul îl vor asculta mai mulți.
Cât despre "trădarea Rusiei", personal cred că situația este exact inversă. Rusia a fost trădată de ordinea post-bipolară. Încă în 1998 am scris (și am reluat ideea de mai multe ori) că Rusia a acceptat dezmembrarea imperiului sovietic și a dat lovitura de grație URSS numai contra promisiunii / așteptării de a fi integrată ca putere de prim rang în noua ordinea globală, subânțelegându-se că va fi co-proiectant și co-fondator al acelei ordini. Ceea ce i s-a oferit a fost "dreptul" de a ocupa o strană în catedrala puterii globale proiectată unilateral de Occident - așa cum însuși dl Kissinger o spune. "Rebeliunea" rusă împotriva acestei stări era, deci, logică și așteptată.
A recunoaște o atare realitate nu înseamnă nici a fi simpatizantul Rusiei nici a simpatiza cu viziunea sa asupra ordinii mondiale. Înseamnă doar a defini corect o problemă de rezolvat. Unii, chiar în aceste zile, vor să o rezolve prin război (pentru orice eventualitate punând răspunderea provocării războiului pe umerii Rusiei). Alții vor să o rezolve prin mijloace politice pașnice. Popoarele trebuie să fie conștiente de alternativă și să își exprime opțiunea. Dacă nu o vor face ele, cu siguranță o vor face alții pentru ele.
Un.
P Iata si
cuvintele lui Henry Kissinger dela WSJ.
Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a relationship with China divided between pledges of cooperation and public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis.
The search for world order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to take up the torch of international leadership and added a new dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects of their clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a concert of enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered people inherently reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international order. Free markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and substitute economic interdependence for traditional international rivalries.
In the Middle East, religious militias violate borders at will. Getty Images
This effort to establish world order has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign states govern most of the world's territory. The spread of democracy and participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not a universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate in real time.
The years from perhaps 1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history when one could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an amalgam of American idealism and traditional European concepts of statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the world have never shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order. These reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of the state itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily on the principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world order. And Europe has not yet given itself attributes of statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power along its borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved into sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each other; religious militias and the powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at will, producing the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their own territory.
The challenge in Asia is the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the edge of confrontation.
The clash between the international economy and the political institutions that ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary for world order. The economic system has become global, while the political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state. Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers. Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile conflicting national aims or ideals of world order.
This dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in 2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union's southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system.
The international order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent on the success of globalization, but the process produces a political reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the current world order, such as it exists, is the absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem an odd criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more by far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and frequency of these meetings work against the elaboration of long-range strategy. This process permits little beyond, at best, a discussion of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of summitry as "social media" event. A contemporary structure of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a matter of common conviction.
The penalty for failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of influence identified with particular domestic structures and forms of governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle between regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle between nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the rest of the world.
A world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of intermediary stages.
To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?
For the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures and views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a relationship with China divided between pledges of cooperation and public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned the modern era is in crisis.
The search for world order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to take up the torch of international leadership and added a new dimension. A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects of their clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a concert of enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered people inherently reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise and common sense; the spread of democracy was therefore the overarching goal for international order. Free markets would uplift individuals, enrich societies and substitute economic interdependence for traditional international rivalries.
In the Middle East, religious militias violate borders at will. Getty Images
This effort to establish world order has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign states govern most of the world's territory. The spread of democracy and participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not a universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate in real time.
The years from perhaps 1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history when one could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an amalgam of American idealism and traditional European concepts of statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the world have never shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order. These reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by the West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of the state itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily on the principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world order. And Europe has not yet given itself attributes of statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power along its borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved into sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each other; religious militias and the powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at will, producing the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their own territory.
The challenge in Asia is the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the edge of confrontation.
The clash between the international economy and the political institutions that ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary for world order. The economic system has become global, while the political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state. Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers. Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile conflicting national aims or ideals of world order.
This dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in 2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those stuck in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union's southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system.
The international order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent on the success of globalization, but the process produces a political reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the current world order, such as it exists, is the absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem an odd criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more by far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and frequency of these meetings work against the elaboration of long-range strategy. This process permits little beyond, at best, a discussion of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of summitry as "social media" event. A contemporary structure of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a matter of common conviction.
The penalty for failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of influence identified with particular domestic structures and forms of governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle between regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle between nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the rest of the world.
A world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of intermediary stages.
To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?
For the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures and views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
Un.P
Iata si cateva opinii ale cititorilor sai:
ROBERT WOLFF 6 hours ago
H.K is a very dry writer. I remember reading his book 40 years ago why it is OK to use tactical nuclear weapons and not the Big Ones - which H.K. believed made him an expert in Nuclear War.
The World Order established after WWII by America was specifically Christian - Keynesianism, Power Sharing, International Regulation, Humanitarian Pluralism - and it is those who have NOT believed in those Christian Democratic Principles who have risen to the top of world power today by subverting the operationalization of those principles who have destroyed it.
And H.K. is one of those.
Is this an expression of his remorse?
Wayne Parker 4 days ago
Samuel L. Huntington got it right back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He predicted a clash of civilizations once the ideological divide of the Cold War broke down. That's what we've all been watching unfold for almost 3 decades now and it will continue for the foreseeable future. FAR too many in the West assume that when they speak of things like democracy, human rights, globalization, etc. that other peoples from very different cultural and historical traditions will think the exact same way or share the same views on these matters. If you live and work overseas for an extended period, you quickly realize that many people in East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet bloc will have very different views on the world order and desirable end goals. It's hubris of the worst kind to expect that the West can impose its value system and goals on literally billions of others who do not share the Western historical, philosophical or political experience.
Pat Curtin 4 days ago
@Wayne Parker
Yes, those "western" value systems of personal freedom, religious tolerance, desire for peace, and hope for achievement through one's efforts are such a hard burden to endure and have nothing in common with people with "eastern" values.
What a corrupt little bubble of an existence to believe people don't share the same human goals.
5
Wayne ParkerWayne Parker 4 days ago
@Pat Curtin Pat, I lived and worked overseas for ten years in Asia. I speak fluent Chinese and some Japanese. All of the ordinary people I met, as well as elites, wanted prosperity but aside from that did not share our Western views on most religious, philosophical, social and political issues. Even where they used Western "political speak", you could see that they were subtly making important changes to what they were internalizing to match their cultural norms. Ask any Western expat who lived and worked among the locals in Asia, Africa or other non-Western parts of the world and they will tell you the same thing. In fact, your views illustrate the arrogance of Westerners that prevents us from seeing the world from the very different world views of others. We do not have to like or acquiesce to their views but we do have to take such views into account if we want to deal with these peoples and resolve issues.
ROBERT WOLFF 6 hours ago
H.K is a very dry writer. I remember reading his book 40 years ago why it is OK to use tactical nuclear weapons and not the Big Ones - which H.K. believed made him an expert in Nuclear War.
The World Order established after WWII by America was specifically Christian - Keynesianism, Power Sharing, International Regulation, Humanitarian Pluralism - and it is those who have NOT believed in those Christian Democratic Principles who have risen to the top of world power today by subverting the operationalization of those principles who have destroyed it.
And H.K. is one of those.
Is this an expression of his remorse?
Wayne Parker 4 days ago
Samuel L. Huntington got it right back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He predicted a clash of civilizations once the ideological divide of the Cold War broke down. That's what we've all been watching unfold for almost 3 decades now and it will continue for the foreseeable future. FAR too many in the West assume that when they speak of things like democracy, human rights, globalization, etc. that other peoples from very different cultural and historical traditions will think the exact same way or share the same views on these matters. If you live and work overseas for an extended period, you quickly realize that many people in East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet bloc will have very different views on the world order and desirable end goals. It's hubris of the worst kind to expect that the West can impose its value system and goals on literally billions of others who do not share the Western historical, philosophical or political experience.
Pat Curtin 4 days ago
@Wayne Parker
Yes, those "western" value systems of personal freedom, religious tolerance, desire for peace, and hope for achievement through one's efforts are such a hard burden to endure and have nothing in common with people with "eastern" values.
What a corrupt little bubble of an existence to believe people don't share the same human goals.
5
Wayne ParkerWayne Parker 4 days ago
@Pat Curtin Pat, I lived and worked overseas for ten years in Asia. I speak fluent Chinese and some Japanese. All of the ordinary people I met, as well as elites, wanted prosperity but aside from that did not share our Western views on most religious, philosophical, social and political issues. Even where they used Western "political speak", you could see that they were subtly making important changes to what they were internalizing to match their cultural norms. Ask any Western expat who lived and worked among the locals in Asia, Africa or other non-Western parts of the world and they will tell you the same thing. In fact, your views illustrate the arrogance of Westerners that prevents us from seeing the world from the very different world views of others. We do not have to like or acquiesce to their views but we do have to take such views into account if we want to deal with these peoples and resolve issues.
Un.
P
Linda Moore 4 days ago
No matter what Mr. Kissinger wants to promote, it is all about authoritarian CONTROL to the detriment of the inalienable rights of the individual.
Democracy is not the form of government our founders created, they understood the inherent evils of democracy. Our founders created a Republic which preserved the rights of individuals.
"The key difference between a democracy and a republic lies in the limits placed on government by the law, which has implications on minority rights. Both forms of government use a representational system where citizens vote to elect politicians to represent their interests and form the government. However, in a republic, a constitution or charter of rights protects certain inalienable rights that cannot be taken away by the government, even if it has been elected by a majority of voters. In a pure democracy, the majority is not restrained and can impose its will on the minority."...diffen.com
However, our government ignores our laws and Constitution. Why?
Glenn Donovan 2 days ago
Kissinger is a war criminal. Sabotaging he Paris Peace talks in '68, arming monsters in Indonesia, and overthrowing Pinochet. These are only some of his crimes. That he has a forum in this paper make bile come up the back of my throat.
His commentary is rubbish. In fact, post WWII interventions by the U.S. have produced chaos, not a new world order. We are hated around the world and laughed at. We are still paying for the folly of arrogant sociopaths like Kissinger. Interventionists never let failure slow them down, it's just amazing.
Jay Titus 4 days ago
" A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just and lasting peace."
The old neocon is addled (but nothing new there).
This country was founded by slavers seeking to minimize the possibility of a government powerful enough or representative enough to take their "property" away.
It grew by virute of slavery and abundant untapped resources (Gold, Iron, Coal, Oil) which could easily be stolen from the native population; and some bad luck on the part of a couple of former colonial powers.
Freedom and Democracy (in the large inclusive sense) had to await a Civil War and the influence of Marx, in the form of the 13th, 14th and 15 amendments....and then some.
Ferguson shows the Southern mind is still not bent.
Mike Anderson 4 days ago
are you kidding me? The NWO concept is an affront to the very idea of sovereignty of not just the nation state but the individual. most world crises of today can be traced to attempts, both failed and successful, to corral the world into the control of a handful of elites. far from being an unfortunate random occurrence, designed chaos is the very fertilizer that the NWO springs from.
Timothy Bendel 4 days ago
Why are people who warn about the New World Order characterized as "conspiracy kooks" when guys like Kissinger are openly proclaiming it?
Linda Moore 4 days ago
No matter what Mr. Kissinger wants to promote, it is all about authoritarian CONTROL to the detriment of the inalienable rights of the individual.
Democracy is not the form of government our founders created, they understood the inherent evils of democracy. Our founders created a Republic which preserved the rights of individuals.
"The key difference between a democracy and a republic lies in the limits placed on government by the law, which has implications on minority rights. Both forms of government use a representational system where citizens vote to elect politicians to represent their interests and form the government. However, in a republic, a constitution or charter of rights protects certain inalienable rights that cannot be taken away by the government, even if it has been elected by a majority of voters. In a pure democracy, the majority is not restrained and can impose its will on the minority."...diffen.com
However, our government ignores our laws and Constitution. Why?
Glenn Donovan 2 days ago
Kissinger is a war criminal. Sabotaging he Paris Peace talks in '68, arming monsters in Indonesia, and overthrowing Pinochet. These are only some of his crimes. That he has a forum in this paper make bile come up the back of my throat.
His commentary is rubbish. In fact, post WWII interventions by the U.S. have produced chaos, not a new world order. We are hated around the world and laughed at. We are still paying for the folly of arrogant sociopaths like Kissinger. Interventionists never let failure slow them down, it's just amazing.
Jay Titus 4 days ago
" A nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just and lasting peace."
The old neocon is addled (but nothing new there).
This country was founded by slavers seeking to minimize the possibility of a government powerful enough or representative enough to take their "property" away.
It grew by virute of slavery and abundant untapped resources (Gold, Iron, Coal, Oil) which could easily be stolen from the native population; and some bad luck on the part of a couple of former colonial powers.
Freedom and Democracy (in the large inclusive sense) had to await a Civil War and the influence of Marx, in the form of the 13th, 14th and 15 amendments....and then some.
Ferguson shows the Southern mind is still not bent.
Mike Anderson 4 days ago
are you kidding me? The NWO concept is an affront to the very idea of sovereignty of not just the nation state but the individual. most world crises of today can be traced to attempts, both failed and successful, to corral the world into the control of a handful of elites. far from being an unfortunate random occurrence, designed chaos is the very fertilizer that the NWO springs from.
Timothy Bendel 4 days ago
Why are people who warn about the New World Order characterized as "conspiracy kooks" when guys like Kissinger are openly proclaiming it?
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