Sunt cativa ani de cand urmaresc activitatea stiintifica si publicistica a istoricului american Larry Watts cu un real interes. Bogatia surselor primare considerate de acesta si calitatea aparatului sau analitic fac din acesta o personalitate din ce ince mai greu de ignorat in spatiul de idei romanesc de pretutindeni. La relativ scurt timp dupa aparitia contributiilor sale la istoria romaneasca post-belica, mai cu seama din perspectiva romano-americana, reactiile nu intarzie sa apara si se impart intre admiratie si contestare, fata de lucrari si autor in acelasi timp. Printre contestatari se numara si dl. Petre Opris, numai ca spre deosebire de majoritatea acestora, dansul furnizeaza si date la care am avut acces prin intermediul Grupului Prospectiv la facebook, unde suntem amandoi membri.
Pe scurt, dl. Opris indica lacune de documentare si/sau redactare in 2 volume majore ale lui Larry Watts si una sau doua instante de interpretare pe care dl. Opris le gaseste problematice pe baza evidentelor din arhivele romanesti. Trebuie spus ca aceste obiectii sunt prezentate de dl. Opris ca exemple si nu ca pe o enumerare exhaustiva a tuturor problemelor pe care acesta le-ar fi identificat in cartile lui Watts: "Ne oprim aici cu enumerarea greşelilor existente în cele două cărţi publicate de cercetătorul Larry L. Watts (deşi mai sunt şi altele, însă nu le expunem aici pentru a nu fi considerat distrugător de mituri româneşti)." Recomandarea finala a dlui Opris este: "Toate acestea ne determină să analizăm cu multe rezerve alte afirmaţii ale istoricului american."
Tot pe scurt, in schema generala de interpretare a d-lui Watts, edificata pe pe date din multiple arhive, se arata ca Romania a fost un aliat al Occidentului, in special al SUA si RFG, inca din timpul lui Gheorghiu Dej si continuand pana in anii regimului Ceausescu.
Revenind la problemele indicate de dl. Opris, pot spune ca cititor de istorie ca destul de multe carti ale unor istorici importanti, care apar la edituri reputabile in SUA, sunt marcate de erori ca cele semnalate de domnul Opris--cauza acceptata aici fiind lipsa editorilor profesionisti. In ceea ce priveste cazurile de interpretare in urma carora dl. Opris s-ar gasi de partea cealalta a d-lui Watts o sa dezvolt unul in cele ce urmeaza.
Dl. Opris scrie: "În volumul publicat în anul 2011, autorul american a susţinut că, „la mijlocul anului 1965, România a fost «brusc» eliminată cu totul din strategia de război a Pactului de la Varşovia”. În opinia noastră, ideea respectivă neglijează complet faptul că autorităţile de la Bucureşti au organizat în 1973 jocul operativ de război „SOIUZ-73”, în care armata română ar fi ajuns la Marea Marmara, flancată de marile unităţi sovietice şi ar fi trecut apoi în Asia Mică prin strâmtoarea Dardanele. Mareşalul sovietic Ivan Iakobovski a asistat la acel exerciţiu pe hartă, desfăşurat în staţiunea Neptun sub conducerea generalului Ion Ioniţă, ministrul Apărării Naţionale (vezi harta)." In alte cuvinte, dl. Opris vrea sa spuna ca dl. Watts ar fi in eroare cand afirma ca Romania a fost eliminata din strategia de razboi a Pactului dela Varsovia. Mai mult, dl. Opris revine "Istoricul american a reluat „în buclă” ideea sa de mai sus, astfel: „Apoi, conceptul a reapărut în perioada «primului Eşalon strategic» de la jumătatea anului 1965, când armata română a fost brusc exclusă din strategia de război a Pactului de la Varşovia. Cu siguranţă, contribuţia militară a României la operaţiunile ofensive ale Pactului era lipsită de importanţă strategică. După 1965 ea a fost, de fapt, inexistentă”. Dacă am accepta ideea cercetătorului american, nu mai putem să explicăm de ce s-a organizat şi desfăşurat în România jocul operativ de război „Soiuz-73” şi nici nu mai pot fi înţelese insistenţele din perioada 1969-1989 ale liderilor politici şi militari sovietici, de a se desfăşura în România exerciţii comune împreună cu generalii armatei române."
Nestiind ceva despre 'Soiuz-43', am cautat si gasit cu Google urmatoarea pagina cu o contributie a d-lui Opris: http://www.art-emis.ro/analize/567-manevrele-militare-balkan-89-din-bulgaria-4-9-iunie-1989.html De aici aflam ca: "Potrivit concepţiei de ansamblu a jocului de război „SOIUZ-73", forţele Grupului de Armate Sud (NATO) atacau Bulgaria şi ajungeau pe aliniamentul: Sud Sofia - Nord Gabcovo - Nord Burgas. Concomitent, forţele aeronavale ale NATO se angajau într-o bătălie la circa 150 de mile Est Constanţa, iar la nord de Burgas era lansat un desant maritim în flancul Frontului 3 Sud (sovietic)." Elementul cheie aici este ca ofensiva ar fi apartinut fortelor NATO, iar romanii simulau in cadrul acestui Soiuz-73 o actiune defensiva--aspect vizibil si in harta operationala unde ofensiva este reprezentata cu sagetile albastre est-vest, iar cu sageti rosii contraofensiva https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMOC0uA8qW_32w_lXWCRlvEwM9pr7ElkkhTTst8GTsaeg532rXYettPnf17kufcHw0P4fLeW4Ld0bURC4VzgD0HFRbWhaf6zgpWuU5j9LYCNvBl18TbAYaTo4YW3a9KswL9Qb6eGPxVak/s1600/1.jpg.
Din acest document al d-lui Opris eu inteleg ca Romania isi construia o optiune de aparare in cazul unui atac al trupelor NATO. N-am de unde sa stiu care a fost procesul in urma caruia dl. Watts scrie ca „la mijlocul anului 1965, România a fost «brusc» eliminată cu totul din strategia de război a Pactului de la Varşovia,” dar, pe baza documentatiei d-lui Opris, pot sa fie de acord cu evaluarea lui Watts "contribuţia militară a României la operaţiunile ofensive ale Pactului era lipsită de importanţă strategică. După 1965 ea a fost, de fapt, inexistentă.” O perspectiva geopolitica realista ar revela ca actiunea defensiva in Balcani era de minima importanta pentru URSS/Pactul dela Varsovia. Intr-adevar, ce ar fi obtinut comunistii avansand pe un asemenea front? Acelasi tip de perspectiva ar condamna pozitia lui Watts daca romanii ar fi participat la exercitii militare la Marea Baltica/RDG sau Polonia, acelea fiind directii candidate ale unei ofensive europene a Pactului de la Varsovia impotriva Vestului. In schema de atunci a lumii, Romania avea o geografie relativ neinteresanta, capitalul de interes al Romaniei fiind mai degraba cel simbolic si asta in alte monezi decat cele ale CAER.
Din acest document al d-lui Opris eu inteleg ca Romania isi construia o optiune de aparare in cazul unui atac al trupelor NATO. N-am de unde sa stiu care a fost procesul in urma caruia dl. Watts scrie ca „la mijlocul anului 1965, România a fost «brusc» eliminată cu totul din strategia de război a Pactului de la Varşovia,” dar, pe baza documentatiei d-lui Opris, pot sa fie de acord cu evaluarea lui Watts "contribuţia militară a României la operaţiunile ofensive ale Pactului era lipsită de importanţă strategică. După 1965 ea a fost, de fapt, inexistentă.” O perspectiva geopolitica realista ar revela ca actiunea defensiva in Balcani era de minima importanta pentru URSS/Pactul dela Varsovia. Intr-adevar, ce ar fi obtinut comunistii avansand pe un asemenea front? Acelasi tip de perspectiva ar condamna pozitia lui Watts daca romanii ar fi participat la exercitii militare la Marea Baltica/RDG sau Polonia, acelea fiind directii candidate ale unei ofensive europene a Pactului de la Varsovia impotriva Vestului. In schema de atunci a lumii, Romania avea o geografie relativ neinteresanta, capitalul de interes al Romaniei fiind mai degraba cel simbolic si asta in alte monezi decat cele ale CAER.
Dat fiind numarul redus de probleme de documentare, relativ la numarul surselor consultate si analizate, si importanta lor scazuta in schema generala de interpretare a d-lui Watts, raman cel mult cateva instante de interpretare problematica ce vor trebui sa constituie baza de pornire a unui dialog intre cei avizati. Ar trebui pornit desigur dela premiza ca in stiintele sociale adevarul se construieste prin dialog, pornind dela fapte si avansand cu interpretare pana la atingerea unui consens calificat. Dl. Watts ar putea ajuta in acest dialog.
La momentul acesta as adauga eu ca jocul Romaniei de care scrie dl. Watts a ridicat costuri si riscuri considerabile pentru Romania si elita politica romaneasca ce n-au fost intotdeauna rasplatite, chiar numai cu recunostinta Vestului, pe masura eforturilor si realizarilor romanesti de subminare a intereselor Blocului Sovietic si ale Moscovei. Critici de acum ai politicii romanesti de atunci adopta o perspectiva curioasa din care condamna pe cei din trecut chiar si atunci cand evidenta istorica recomanda o alta pozitie. De fapt, pozitia acestor critici este aidoma aceleia a inchizitorilor sau comisarilor ideologici din timpul ocupatiei-eliberatoare(sic!) sovietice, pretind absolutul dela romani si asuma absolutul Vestului.
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Mai mult, il acuzati pe Watts de 1) 'selecţia documentelor şi utilizarea lor (într-un mod neprofesionist, din punctul meu de vedere);' respectiv 2) "Domnul Larry L. Watts nu are dubii în privinţa modului de selecţionare a documentelor şi nu aduce nici un contraargument la ideile pe care le vehiculează." Constat cu tristete, si eu ca si altii, ca dezbaterea aceasta aluneca dela lucrarile lui Watts la personajul Watts. In primul rand, este rolul dvs., al criticilor, sa dovediti ca selectia faptelor istorice facuta de Watts a fost intentionat gresita. In al doilea rand, da, re/cunosc si eu povestea popperiana conform careia stiinta este numai ceea ce poate fi contrazis, dar nu este musai ca autorul sa se autocontrazica, aceasta este rolul celorlalti. In cazuri rare, vad in alte stiinte sociale decat istoria ca autorii procedeaza cum spuneti prin ridicarea unor 'explicatii alternative', pe care tot ei le contrazic si in felul acesta se cauta sa se demonstreze cauzalitate pe teza principala avansata de ei in conditiile unui mecanism cauzal incert. Ar putea lucrarile lui Watts sa beneficieze de asa ceva? Las asta la discretia cititorilor/criticilor sai, dar n-am sa fac dintr-asta un capat de acuzare. In plus, cel care acuza in acest fel ar face bine sa ilustreze prin propriile lucrari ca ceea ce predica si practica.
De dragul artei am sa ridic eu o explicatie alternativa la toate cele: 'Romania a jucat foarte abil, cel putin pana la momentul Reagan, rolul de cartita sovietica in Vest, ceea ce i-a permis sa suga ca mielul bland la doua oi.' Pot vedea avantajele 'impersonarii' aliatului vestic, dar nu pot vedea avantajele jocului ca entitate a Moscovei--decat daca aratata cineva documente din care sa reiasa transfer de tehnologie sovietica, civila si militara, si preturi de dumping la materiile prime pe care Romania le-ar fi importat din URSS. Ce nu poate suporta o asemenea teza sunt datele din arhiva STASI din care reiese ideea ca Romania era inamicul tuturor in Pactul dela Varsovia. Pana la urma, putem construi anti-teze care mai de care mai fanteziste, trebuie totusi sa intervina undeva si Briciul lui Occam. Explicatia cea mai economica prevaleaza.
Domnule Opris, ganditi asa va rog, ca istoric cu acces la arhivele romanesti aveti un avantaj. Ca sursa de interpretari a ceea ce stim ramane de vazut. Deocamdata, date furnizate de dvs. nu conving in demolarea tezei lui Watts, dar, dupa cum ati scris in mod repetat, sunteti abia la inceput.
Domnule Opris, ganditi asa va rog, ca istoric cu acces la arhivele romanesti aveti un avantaj. Ca sursa de interpretari a ceea ce stim ramane de vazut. Deocamdata, date furnizate de dvs. nu conving in demolarea tezei lui Watts, dar, dupa cum ati scris in mod repetat, sunteti abia la inceput.
P.S. Faptul ca invocati numele unui alt istoric, dna Zoe Petre, nu stiu ce aduce in plus, la un moment dat am rugat-o sa ne faca partasi la cum a ajuns dansa la o concluzie, dar n-am aflat inca pana azi ce si cum.
LARRY L. WATTS: First off, let me say that the discussion I have read on your blog has been admirable, with very many points well worth discussion. I hope to address many of them. For now, however, there are a few points that I would like to clarify and considerations I would like to introduce (although some of them have already been raised by your readers in other contexts.) My statement, “In mid-1965 Romania was ‘abruptly’ dropped from Warsaw Pact war planning altogether,” is made on the basis of a Parallel History Project Hungarian study on Soviet war planning. Since this was a measure undertaken without informing the Romanians, one would require additional evidence from Soviet or other loyalist member sources to falsify it. Evidence of Romania’s continued participation in map exercises regarding defensive operations, as you rightly point out, does not negate its exclusion from offensive war planning. There are several issues involved here. First, Romania’s exclusion from offensive war planning, the evidence for which I cited Imre Okvath, the former head of the Analysis Department in Hungary’s Office of History and current chief of the Main Department of Science at the Historical Archive of the State Security in Hungary. According to Dr. Okvath’s study of Warsaw Pact war planning (at http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/
“Interestingly, until 1965 the Hungarian 5th army
was expected to work in close cooperation with the Romanian 3rd army in all
military manoeuvers and operational plans; afterward, the Romanian armed forces
abruptly disappeared from the scene. This abrupt change in Warsaw Pact military
planning can be explained by the emergence of a new political line followed by
the Romanian leadership now headed by Nicolae Ceauşescu. This was aimed at
fostering the idea of national sovereignty within the alliance and trying to
gain national control over nuclear weapons, while at the same time the new
leadership declared the policy of working for the elimination of the two
opposing military blocs. Since none of these ideas were welcomed by the Soviets
at the time, this resulted in a special treatment of the Romanian armed forces
as far as military planning was concerned from this time on.”
Any
evidence from Romanian sources – military or otherwise – is of the wrong sort
to falsify this. One would require more compelling evidence from the other Pact
members at the time (for example, from the Soviet-era, Polish, East German or
Czech or Slovak archives) or contrary evidence from the Hungarian archives.
Verification
of Romania’s lack of serious military cooperation from Romanian archival
sources, other Pact – including Soviet - sources, and from American sources
during 1964-1966 is plentiful. It was
even plastered on the front page of the New York Times (e.g. December 19, 1964; May 14-18 and 22, 1966). And it was far worse than mere “lack of cooperation,” it had become an
active effort to constrain the USSR’s unilateral use of the military force of
the Warsaw Pact. As I note in the book, in July 1965 Ceausescu told Deng
Xiaopeng that Romania “intended to do away with” Soviet control of the national
armies in the Warsaw Pact (see the document in the collection by Dennis
Deletant, Mihail Ionescu and Anna Locher at http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/
A
month earlier, in June 1965, Sherman Kent, the chief analyst at the Central
Intelligence Agency and the head of its Office of National Estimates from 1953
until 1968, captured Romanian thinking and the dilemma it posed for Moscow with
extraordinary insight. This document was not available to me when I wrote With Friends Like These/Fereste-ma, Doamne,
de prieten, so, with your indulgence, I append some sections of it here
(the paper, which was for CIA internal distribution only, is titled “Staff
Memorandum No. 24-65: Rumania and the Warsaw Pact, 25 June 1965” is available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/
“Certainly
the evidence suggests that Bucharest would at least like to leave the
Pact, and certainly, if it should do so, the repercussions would transcend the
purely local… [T]hey almost certainly view the Pact as another Soviet device
for insuring Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and as another instrument for
bringing pressure to bear on the member states. …
Moscow’s ability to alter the
Rumanian attitude is probably quite limited. Should Bucharest reduce its
participation in the Pact to a purely formal level, refuse to participate in
Pact exercises and make only a minimal contribution to Pact forces, Moscow would
either have to tacitly acknowledge Rumania’s sovereign right to do so, change
its plans for the Pact as a whole (as in fact it did for the CMEA when faced
with comparable Rumanian opposition), or seek somehow to compel the Rumanians
to acquiesce in Soviet plans.
The latter would be most
difficult to accomplish. The Soviets almost certainly do not possess sufficient
assets within the Rumanian party to overthrow the present regime. Nor do they
possess a throttlehold on the Rumanian economy. Bucharest is probably in a
better position to resist Soviet economic pressures than either China or
Yugoslavia were; in any case, a Soviet boycott would almost certainly turn the
Rumanians toward the West for help. A withdrawal of Soviet military aid would
probably have the same effect. A Soviet bribe, such as a major economic aid
program, would also be unlikely to work. The Rumanian leaders are not the sort
who would be likely to barter their independence, even were they in great need
of outside economic assistance. …
[T]here is one very telling
reason why the Soviets might actually use force in the event that Romania was,
in effect, defecting from the camp (by withdrawing from the Pact or in some
other way): to preserve their empire, not only in Rumania but throughout
Eastern Europe. A failure to intervene would signal to the other Eastern
European states and, indeed, to the world at large, that the USSR had either
deliberately decided to let the empire break up or that it was powerless to
prevent it. …
The nature of the general Soviet
dilemma is most clear in this context. An invasion of Rumania is most clear in
this context. An invasion of Rumania would in many respects damage Soviet
interests throughout the area and would carry with it at least the risk of
trouble elsewhere in the Bloc.”
Romania
did indeed think about leaving the alliance from 1964 on-and-off until the end
of the 1960s/beginning of the 1970s. However, the central question – “Will it
improve the security situation of Romania?” – could never be answered
positively. NATO never offered it an alternative and was quite explicit on the
impossibility of such a consideration (regardless of the fact that Bucharest
actually concluded a friendship and assistance alliance with NATO member
Portugal in the mid-1970s; a unique occurrence in the Warsaw Pact). Had Romania
left the Pact it would have remained in the same geographic space with the same
three Warsaw Pact members encircling it, only, instead of being allies – even if
purely pro forma – they would be open adversaries. And, instead of the limited
access to information and planning that membership afforded it, Romania would
be completely blind and deaf to the inner workings of their alliance.
Thus,
Bucharest decided to remain in the Pact, but on ROMANIAN rather than SOVIET
terms. Bodnaras clearly stated this to U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes in March
1974, as I note in my book. The Soviet interest in keeping Romania a member of
the alliance was also paramount, surmounting even public challenges to Soviet
authority and active obstruction of its foreign and security policies and even
military operations (for example, in the Middle East). Participation in Pact
exercises that didn’t contravene Romanian policy – i.e. non-offensive
operations – was one way in which Romania ‘proved’ its on-going membership.
Another was participation in Pact and Soviet-sponsored meetings, although often
the participation in non-Pact and especially ideological meetings was only pro
forma, the Romanian delegation would often leave after the opening ceremony.
Moscow, in contrast, would seek to portray them as enthusiastic participants.
How
did Romania’s de facto withdrawal while remaining a member of the Pact play out
with the Soviet Union, and especially the Soviet military? There are a variety
of sources on this, ranging from the State Department and CIA reports of
1964/1965 to the memoirs of Soviet military officers. First off, it is useful
to disembarrass ourselves of the twin myths that Romania never considered
leaving the Warsaw Pact and that the Soviet Union would not have been bothered
had they done so. However, even if the communist regime in Romania had been
fully committed to the alliance throughout the Cold War, it would have mattered
not at all if Moscow believed it was contemplating departure, especially if
Moscow assessed such a departure as seriously undermining Soviet security. In
interstate relations, as in politics everywhere, perception is everything. (To
quote Marx “The secret of life is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake
that, you’ve got it made.” – that’s Groucho Marx, by the way).
Romanian
military interest in leaving the alliance appears in CIA and State Department
reporting from November 1964 and in reporting from within the Pact that summer,
including Khrushchev’s declaration to Czechoslovak Party leader Novotny that
“The Balkans would become uncontrollable if Romania moved into the anti-Soviet
camp. [We must] stop Romania leaving the Pact.” [Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You).
We have the Polish transcript of the Pact’s Budapest meeting – plus Yugoslavia
and minus Romania – in June 1967 where Brezhnev stated, after Romania refused
its territory and airspace for the transport of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military
assistance to its client states during the 6-Day War, that “everything indicates they intend to break
relations with our camp” and announce their “departure from the Warsaw Pact.”
(Available at http://digitalarchive.
To
my mind, the clearest expression of actual Soviet-Romanian military relations
is that given by the former chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, General Anatoly
Gribkov, in his 1998 memoir. Again, unfortunately, I was unaware of its
existence at the time I published With
Friends Like These, so this is not included in that volume. It is, however,
well worth considering:
“The
Romanians were concerned they would share the fate of Czechoslovakia. So they
adopted a doctrine of “defense of the entire people.” Gradually and secretly
they redeployed their troops. The best-equipped and most combat capable
divisions were deployed close to the Soviet border and to the Iron Gates, and
close to the border with Bulgaria. Later the Hungarian front was strengthened –
the contested territory of Transylvania. They deployed anti-aircraft
batteries with combat charges, at all airports, including the capital, for
destruction of aircraft and airborne troops. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief
of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces did not have the right to land at
Romanian airports or to fly across its territory to Bulgaria without written
permission from the Romanian authorities. When a [Soviet] aircraft approached
Romania - it was as if it was about to be put under enemy fire. All of Romanian became an armed
camp. In technical schools and standard schools students in the higher grades
intensively studies military affairs. There as no fulfillment of operational
plans worked out previously and no fulfillment of plans for the event of a NATO
attack—although this was plainly necessary. Fundamental changes were
introduced into the plans for the purchasing of armament; the Romanians only
procured basically defensive systems for anti-aircraft, for interceptor
aircraft, communications equipment and anti-tank weapons.”
