de uichend
(text lung in engleza despre China)
China is a bureaucratic-authoritarian one-party state, in principle highly centralized but in practice substantially decentralized. Ultimate authority resides not in the individual leader but in the Communist Party, which sits atop the political system and directs the operations of the government and the military, selects leaders who are subject to term limits, mandatory retirement ages, and more or less formal requirements to obtain consensus from the rest of the senior leadership group (possibly including retired officials) on major policy decisions.
The CCP has 86 million members (over 5% of the population) that reaches into every organized sector of life including the government, courts, the media, companies (state-owned and private), universities, and religious organizations. Top officials in all these organizations are appointed by the party's Organization Department. A similar department in the U.S. would oversee the appointment of the entire U.S. cabinet, state governors and their deputies, the mayors of major cities, the heads of all federal regulatory agencies, the CEOs of GE, Exxon-Mobil, Wal-Mart and about 50 of the remaining largest U.S. companies, the justices on the Supreme Court, editors of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, the bosses of the TV networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities, and the head of think-tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.
A 2004 IMF study found that, in the period 1972-2000, the share of government expenditure taking place at the subnational level averaged 25% for democracies, 54% for China 1958-2002, and 85% by 2014. In 1979, China's central planners controlled the allocation of only 600 commodities and the prices of a few thousand, compared to the 60,000 commodities and millions of prices determined by state planners in the USSR. In 1979 the Soviet Union had 40,000 state-run factories - many run from Moscow, while China had 883,000 - of which 800,000 were controlled by city and county governments.
Deng, long before Tiananmen, declared Gorbachev 'an idiot' for putting political reforms ahead of economic ones.
Between 1970 and 2010, only 14 countries managed to increase per capital income relative to the U.S. by 10 percentage points or more. Seven of these were peripheral countries in Europe, another was Israel, and the other six were all in East Asia. By far the biggest gains were in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Successful East Asian developmental economic-growth had three pillars - land reform, export manufacturing, and financial repression.
Big estates and plantations were broken up, creating a class of rural smallholders with higher yields. The resources thus captured by government provided the seed capital for state-led investment in basic industry and infrastructure. The basic reason poor countries are poor is that they lack the technological capital that rich countries have, which make output/worker much higher. Exports help associated necessary because, after first earning the foreign exchange via agricultural products, handicrafts, and cheap manufactures, the nations can use that to buy the capital equipment enabling higher-value production. Later, after establishing an industrial base, exporting requires competing with producers from around the world. The only way to accomplish this is to make certain your own technology (including management techniques) is reasonably close to the global standard. Producers who rely mainly on the domestic market often have less incentive to invest in technology since they may find it cheaper to use political influence to rig the local markets in their favor.
Financial repression typically refers to regulated low interest rates, so that the cash flows from economic growth are not captured by 'rentiers' living off interest income, but instead subsidize borrowing to fund investments in infrastructure and corporate investments in industry. Also tightly managed and typically undervalued exchange rates to make the country's exports cheaper. Capital controls, to prevent companies and rich individuals siphoning off national wealth into investments abroad, and instead compel profits to be reinvested in the domestic economy.
This 'East Asian development model' is an adaptation of the strategy advocated by German economist Friedrich List (1789-1846), which in turn drew inspiration from the 'American System' created in the early U.S. by Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay. The U.S. and Bismarck's Germany were the two most successful 'catch-up' economies of the 19th century. China adopted all of this program by breaking up the Mao-era communes into small owner-tilled plots, aggressively promoting export manufacturing, and repressing its financial system to fund large-scale investments in infrastructure and basic industry.
China did differ, however, by relying far more heavily on SOEs - in postwar Japan the state set the rules and controlled resource flows, but most of the companies and banks were privately owned. South Korea's banks were mainly owned by the state, but most of its large companies were private conglomerates. All the big banks in Taiwan were (and still are) state-owned, but there was also a very large body of private small-and medium-sized enterprises that spearheaded its drive into export markets. Many of its state- and party-owned enterprises were privatized in the 1980s and early 1990s. China began its high-growth era in 1979 with virtually all assets in state hands, and 35 years later it still has the biggest state sector of any major economy. Since economic officials of the reform era inherited a country virtually w/o legal or regulatory systems, they found it convenient to regulate via the enterprises they controlled. Today, nearly half of all Chinese exports, and 75% of high-technology exports, are produced by foreign firms - utterly different from the other East Asian countries.
Postwar South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan shut down FDI automobile plants in the 1970s as part of a drive to build up domestic car champions. China was not part of U.S. alliances in East Asia, which provided immense technical assistance and unfettered access to America's gigantic market. Those alliances also worked to push their adoption of democratic political systems - especially with Taiwan vs. the U.S. after the U.S. began normalizing relations with China.
Present Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping combines ambitious economic reform with a campaign to tighten political control. The uncontested power of the party makes possible vigorous economic development policies hard to sustain in a more open system. Moreover, party leaders have long recognized that in the international arena, national power is a direct result of economic might. Many individual economic reforms require the state to give up some power - eg. streamlining SOEs means a big reduction in the state's ownership of assets, financial liberalization means cutting the government's ability to direct capital to its favored projects.
In the late 1970s, Agriculture was the biggest sector of China's economy - 37% of GDP and nearly 75% of all employment. Per capita production of grain (about 300 kg) was no higher in 1978 than it had been in 1955, and output of oil seeds fell by about a third. Restrictions on mobility left the rural share of population at 82%, higher than it had been in 1958. Agriculture now accounts for only 9% of China's GDP, while industry and services each comprise over 40%. But nearly half the population still lives in rural areas, and over one-third the workforce till the fields. By the end of 1982 virtually all agricultural collectives were gone, and family farmers assigned rights to cultivate individual plots of land. By 1984 grain output was a third higher than six year prior, oilseeds and cotton sustained annual growth rates of 15%, and meat production growing by 10%/year. Rural per capita income more than doubled between 1979 and 1984.
Use of chemical fertilizer tripled between 1978 and 1990, as did farm machinery. Farmers began saving money, and those funds were available for lending to new manufacturing enterprises. Increasing numbers began to seek off-farm wage labor to supplement their incomes - helping launch China's first wave of entrepreneurial activity - TVEs owned by township and village governments.
China's enormous trade surplus as late as 1800 (accounted for about 1/3rd of world GDP) brought a drain of silver currency from Europe and ultimately led to the Opium War of 1840-42. It's re-emergence after Mao was helped by Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan having created an easy-to-follow template for industrial development, its opening up to trade just as the shipping container began to make possible the creation of global production chains and steep reductions in long-distance shipping costs.
Deng Xiaoping inherited an industrial economy that was overly reliant on capital-intensive heavy industry - while it had relatively little capital and plenty of cheap labor. A second problem - most industry was in the hands of SOEs, who had few incentives to improve efficiency. Shifting to labor-intensive light industry, light industrial exports that generated the funds to import capital equipment, price reforms, and increased tolerance for private enterprises came from China's neighbors, while establishing SEZs came from Yugoslavia - and eventually morphed into an FDI-driven growth model.
Between 1978 and 1990, SOE share of industrial production fell from 78% to 54%. Partial price reform (70% of consumer goods)meant many products had two prices - a low plan price and a high market price. Many officials profited by buying up goods in short supply at cheap plan prices and reselling them on the free market. This and high inflation were two important causes of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Immediately after that massacre, conservative leaders brought reforms to a halt - however, in early 1992 Deng made his famous southern tour, kick-starting a new, more aggressive reform phase. By the end of the 1990s, 95% of consumer goods and 90% of agricultural commodities were purely market-priced.
The most noteworthy characteristic of this second reform phase was the strong emphasis on enticing foreign companies to invest in China and building up export industries. FDI had run at $2 - $3 billion/year in the 1980s and mostly consisted of small-scale Hong Kong manufacturers moving their factories across the border to Shenzhen - FDI hit $45 billion in 1997. Between 1990 and 2001 China's exports more than quadrupled, from $62 to $266 billion - more than half produced by foreign firms. The biggest SOEs were reorganized under a central government agency with a mandate to turn them into global champions. Infrastructure building and privatization of the urban housing market created an explosion in demand for steel, cement, and glass. From 2000 to 2014, China's steel production rose nearly sevenfold to where China produced about half the world's steel and more than 7X as much as #2 Japan; similarly with cement. These booms were extended by stimulus policies launched after the 2008 global financial crisis. China wound up with an oversupply of housing and excess capacity in many heavy industries.
Until the late 1990s, most urban residents lived in apartments assigned them by their work units, for which they paid a nominal rent. This gave little incentive for anyone to build new homes, housing was in short supply, and most families lived in cramped quarters with about 150 square feet of living space/person. Under Zhu Rongji's reforms, SOEs and government work units were ordered to sell off the housing they controlled at prices thought to represent a big discount to market value. However, even at these low 'insider' prices, many had difficulty affording their apartments, so they received subsidies from the government or their employers, or mortgages at concessional rates. In return, buyers were often prevented from selling their newly acquired apartments for a period of time, usually five years. His was on of the greatest wealth transfers in history. The value of that wealth transfer was about $540 billion - about one-third of China's 2003 GDP.
By 2012, studies concluded the home ownership rate among urban hukou holders was 70-80% (U.S. peak was 69% in 2004), and the rate for migrant families was 10% or less - migrant workers mostly lived in company dormitories, underground apartments created in basements and air-raid shelters, or rooms in converted farmhouses on the city outskirts. The minimum legal down payment for owner-occupied houses in China is 20%, and until recently most cities required a 60-70% down payment for investment properties. Since the government started intervening to control rises in house prices in 2010, the average price of an ordinary flat has fallen from 9X average household income to less than 7X, a normal figure for East Asia. Thus, the author does not believe there's much evidence for an overall 'housing bubble.' He does, however, believe there's a bubble in high-end housing, and a shortage for migrants etc. who cannot afford much.
China has decided to let the small SOEs go (privatized), and the 'commanding heights' (aviation, railways, telecoms, power generation and distribution; upstream production of oil, gas, and coal; basic heavy industries such as steel, aluminum, and petrochemicals; production of critical heavy machinery such as machine tools and power generation equipment; infrastructure engineering for the construction of roads, dams, ports, nd railways; 'pillar' consumer durables - automobiles; and military equipment) would be controlled under the central government, and in virtually every instance, several competing enterprises were set up in each area. The final move in SOE reform was the establishment of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 to act as the government shareholder in nearly 200 centrally controlled SOE business groups. SASAC too responsibility for appointing senior management and holding them accountable for meeting targets such as ROA and market share. Local SASACs were set up for cities/towns to manager their smaller-scale SOEs. SASAC's other goal was to gradually reduce the number of centrally controlled business groups to under 100. The logic was a desire for the big SOEs to develop into globally competitive 'national champion' companies via further consolidation. Over a decade, it has reduced those SOE groups under its control to 111, comprising about 23,000 companies.
Despite recent SOE pruning, China still has the largest state sector, relative to GDP, of any major economy.. In 2013, China had about 150,000 SOEs, with combined assets of about $17 trillion, 177% of GDP. Those controlled by the central government account for about one/third the total number, and slightly less than half of SOE assets. The remaining SOEs are controlled by provincial and other local governments. In 2014, 92 mainland Chinese firms were in the Fortune Global 500 list - 59 were central SOEs, 23 local-government SOEs, 10 were private firms. The author estimates that SOEs account for about 35% of GDP, firms controlled by foreign investors 5%, and the remaining 60% from domestic private firms.
Only the national railway system and the tobacco SOEs are monopolies. In 2011, there were 880 SOEs in coal mining, 312 in steel, and 264 in nonferrous metals processing. China has relied more on greater competition, rather than privatization, to accomplish its transition from plan to market. However, competition only works if losing firms exit the market. Since the conclusion of these reforms in about 2005, state firms have rarely done either because of preferential access to bank credit, rotation of senior executives, and market share protections.
Loyd Eskildson
(text lung in engleza despre China)
China is a bureaucratic-authoritarian one-party state, in principle highly centralized but in practice substantially decentralized. Ultimate authority resides not in the individual leader but in the Communist Party, which sits atop the political system and directs the operations of the government and the military, selects leaders who are subject to term limits, mandatory retirement ages, and more or less formal requirements to obtain consensus from the rest of the senior leadership group (possibly including retired officials) on major policy decisions.
The CCP has 86 million members (over 5% of the population) that reaches into every organized sector of life including the government, courts, the media, companies (state-owned and private), universities, and religious organizations. Top officials in all these organizations are appointed by the party's Organization Department. A similar department in the U.S. would oversee the appointment of the entire U.S. cabinet, state governors and their deputies, the mayors of major cities, the heads of all federal regulatory agencies, the CEOs of GE, Exxon-Mobil, Wal-Mart and about 50 of the remaining largest U.S. companies, the justices on the Supreme Court, editors of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, the bosses of the TV networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities, and the head of think-tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.
A 2004 IMF study found that, in the period 1972-2000, the share of government expenditure taking place at the subnational level averaged 25% for democracies, 54% for China 1958-2002, and 85% by 2014. In 1979, China's central planners controlled the allocation of only 600 commodities and the prices of a few thousand, compared to the 60,000 commodities and millions of prices determined by state planners in the USSR. In 1979 the Soviet Union had 40,000 state-run factories - many run from Moscow, while China had 883,000 - of which 800,000 were controlled by city and county governments.
Deng, long before Tiananmen, declared Gorbachev 'an idiot' for putting political reforms ahead of economic ones.
Between 1970 and 2010, only 14 countries managed to increase per capital income relative to the U.S. by 10 percentage points or more. Seven of these were peripheral countries in Europe, another was Israel, and the other six were all in East Asia. By far the biggest gains were in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Successful East Asian developmental economic-growth had three pillars - land reform, export manufacturing, and financial repression.
Big estates and plantations were broken up, creating a class of rural smallholders with higher yields. The resources thus captured by government provided the seed capital for state-led investment in basic industry and infrastructure. The basic reason poor countries are poor is that they lack the technological capital that rich countries have, which make output/worker much higher. Exports help associated necessary because, after first earning the foreign exchange via agricultural products, handicrafts, and cheap manufactures, the nations can use that to buy the capital equipment enabling higher-value production. Later, after establishing an industrial base, exporting requires competing with producers from around the world. The only way to accomplish this is to make certain your own technology (including management techniques) is reasonably close to the global standard. Producers who rely mainly on the domestic market often have less incentive to invest in technology since they may find it cheaper to use political influence to rig the local markets in their favor.
Financial repression typically refers to regulated low interest rates, so that the cash flows from economic growth are not captured by 'rentiers' living off interest income, but instead subsidize borrowing to fund investments in infrastructure and corporate investments in industry. Also tightly managed and typically undervalued exchange rates to make the country's exports cheaper. Capital controls, to prevent companies and rich individuals siphoning off national wealth into investments abroad, and instead compel profits to be reinvested in the domestic economy.
This 'East Asian development model' is an adaptation of the strategy advocated by German economist Friedrich List (1789-1846), which in turn drew inspiration from the 'American System' created in the early U.S. by Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay. The U.S. and Bismarck's Germany were the two most successful 'catch-up' economies of the 19th century. China adopted all of this program by breaking up the Mao-era communes into small owner-tilled plots, aggressively promoting export manufacturing, and repressing its financial system to fund large-scale investments in infrastructure and basic industry.
China did differ, however, by relying far more heavily on SOEs - in postwar Japan the state set the rules and controlled resource flows, but most of the companies and banks were privately owned. South Korea's banks were mainly owned by the state, but most of its large companies were private conglomerates. All the big banks in Taiwan were (and still are) state-owned, but there was also a very large body of private small-and medium-sized enterprises that spearheaded its drive into export markets. Many of its state- and party-owned enterprises were privatized in the 1980s and early 1990s. China began its high-growth era in 1979 with virtually all assets in state hands, and 35 years later it still has the biggest state sector of any major economy. Since economic officials of the reform era inherited a country virtually w/o legal or regulatory systems, they found it convenient to regulate via the enterprises they controlled. Today, nearly half of all Chinese exports, and 75% of high-technology exports, are produced by foreign firms - utterly different from the other East Asian countries.
Postwar South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan shut down FDI automobile plants in the 1970s as part of a drive to build up domestic car champions. China was not part of U.S. alliances in East Asia, which provided immense technical assistance and unfettered access to America's gigantic market. Those alliances also worked to push their adoption of democratic political systems - especially with Taiwan vs. the U.S. after the U.S. began normalizing relations with China.
Present Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping combines ambitious economic reform with a campaign to tighten political control. The uncontested power of the party makes possible vigorous economic development policies hard to sustain in a more open system. Moreover, party leaders have long recognized that in the international arena, national power is a direct result of economic might. Many individual economic reforms require the state to give up some power - eg. streamlining SOEs means a big reduction in the state's ownership of assets, financial liberalization means cutting the government's ability to direct capital to its favored projects.
In the late 1970s, Agriculture was the biggest sector of China's economy - 37% of GDP and nearly 75% of all employment. Per capita production of grain (about 300 kg) was no higher in 1978 than it had been in 1955, and output of oil seeds fell by about a third. Restrictions on mobility left the rural share of population at 82%, higher than it had been in 1958. Agriculture now accounts for only 9% of China's GDP, while industry and services each comprise over 40%. But nearly half the population still lives in rural areas, and over one-third the workforce till the fields. By the end of 1982 virtually all agricultural collectives were gone, and family farmers assigned rights to cultivate individual plots of land. By 1984 grain output was a third higher than six year prior, oilseeds and cotton sustained annual growth rates of 15%, and meat production growing by 10%/year. Rural per capita income more than doubled between 1979 and 1984.
Use of chemical fertilizer tripled between 1978 and 1990, as did farm machinery. Farmers began saving money, and those funds were available for lending to new manufacturing enterprises. Increasing numbers began to seek off-farm wage labor to supplement their incomes - helping launch China's first wave of entrepreneurial activity - TVEs owned by township and village governments.
China's enormous trade surplus as late as 1800 (accounted for about 1/3rd of world GDP) brought a drain of silver currency from Europe and ultimately led to the Opium War of 1840-42. It's re-emergence after Mao was helped by Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan having created an easy-to-follow template for industrial development, its opening up to trade just as the shipping container began to make possible the creation of global production chains and steep reductions in long-distance shipping costs.
Deng Xiaoping inherited an industrial economy that was overly reliant on capital-intensive heavy industry - while it had relatively little capital and plenty of cheap labor. A second problem - most industry was in the hands of SOEs, who had few incentives to improve efficiency. Shifting to labor-intensive light industry, light industrial exports that generated the funds to import capital equipment, price reforms, and increased tolerance for private enterprises came from China's neighbors, while establishing SEZs came from Yugoslavia - and eventually morphed into an FDI-driven growth model.
Between 1978 and 1990, SOE share of industrial production fell from 78% to 54%. Partial price reform (70% of consumer goods)meant many products had two prices - a low plan price and a high market price. Many officials profited by buying up goods in short supply at cheap plan prices and reselling them on the free market. This and high inflation were two important causes of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Immediately after that massacre, conservative leaders brought reforms to a halt - however, in early 1992 Deng made his famous southern tour, kick-starting a new, more aggressive reform phase. By the end of the 1990s, 95% of consumer goods and 90% of agricultural commodities were purely market-priced.
The most noteworthy characteristic of this second reform phase was the strong emphasis on enticing foreign companies to invest in China and building up export industries. FDI had run at $2 - $3 billion/year in the 1980s and mostly consisted of small-scale Hong Kong manufacturers moving their factories across the border to Shenzhen - FDI hit $45 billion in 1997. Between 1990 and 2001 China's exports more than quadrupled, from $62 to $266 billion - more than half produced by foreign firms. The biggest SOEs were reorganized under a central government agency with a mandate to turn them into global champions. Infrastructure building and privatization of the urban housing market created an explosion in demand for steel, cement, and glass. From 2000 to 2014, China's steel production rose nearly sevenfold to where China produced about half the world's steel and more than 7X as much as #2 Japan; similarly with cement. These booms were extended by stimulus policies launched after the 2008 global financial crisis. China wound up with an oversupply of housing and excess capacity in many heavy industries.
Until the late 1990s, most urban residents lived in apartments assigned them by their work units, for which they paid a nominal rent. This gave little incentive for anyone to build new homes, housing was in short supply, and most families lived in cramped quarters with about 150 square feet of living space/person. Under Zhu Rongji's reforms, SOEs and government work units were ordered to sell off the housing they controlled at prices thought to represent a big discount to market value. However, even at these low 'insider' prices, many had difficulty affording their apartments, so they received subsidies from the government or their employers, or mortgages at concessional rates. In return, buyers were often prevented from selling their newly acquired apartments for a period of time, usually five years. His was on of the greatest wealth transfers in history. The value of that wealth transfer was about $540 billion - about one-third of China's 2003 GDP.
By 2012, studies concluded the home ownership rate among urban hukou holders was 70-80% (U.S. peak was 69% in 2004), and the rate for migrant families was 10% or less - migrant workers mostly lived in company dormitories, underground apartments created in basements and air-raid shelters, or rooms in converted farmhouses on the city outskirts. The minimum legal down payment for owner-occupied houses in China is 20%, and until recently most cities required a 60-70% down payment for investment properties. Since the government started intervening to control rises in house prices in 2010, the average price of an ordinary flat has fallen from 9X average household income to less than 7X, a normal figure for East Asia. Thus, the author does not believe there's much evidence for an overall 'housing bubble.' He does, however, believe there's a bubble in high-end housing, and a shortage for migrants etc. who cannot afford much.
China has decided to let the small SOEs go (privatized), and the 'commanding heights' (aviation, railways, telecoms, power generation and distribution; upstream production of oil, gas, and coal; basic heavy industries such as steel, aluminum, and petrochemicals; production of critical heavy machinery such as machine tools and power generation equipment; infrastructure engineering for the construction of roads, dams, ports, nd railways; 'pillar' consumer durables - automobiles; and military equipment) would be controlled under the central government, and in virtually every instance, several competing enterprises were set up in each area. The final move in SOE reform was the establishment of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 to act as the government shareholder in nearly 200 centrally controlled SOE business groups. SASAC too responsibility for appointing senior management and holding them accountable for meeting targets such as ROA and market share. Local SASACs were set up for cities/towns to manager their smaller-scale SOEs. SASAC's other goal was to gradually reduce the number of centrally controlled business groups to under 100. The logic was a desire for the big SOEs to develop into globally competitive 'national champion' companies via further consolidation. Over a decade, it has reduced those SOE groups under its control to 111, comprising about 23,000 companies.
Despite recent SOE pruning, China still has the largest state sector, relative to GDP, of any major economy.. In 2013, China had about 150,000 SOEs, with combined assets of about $17 trillion, 177% of GDP. Those controlled by the central government account for about one/third the total number, and slightly less than half of SOE assets. The remaining SOEs are controlled by provincial and other local governments. In 2014, 92 mainland Chinese firms were in the Fortune Global 500 list - 59 were central SOEs, 23 local-government SOEs, 10 were private firms. The author estimates that SOEs account for about 35% of GDP, firms controlled by foreign investors 5%, and the remaining 60% from domestic private firms.
Only the national railway system and the tobacco SOEs are monopolies. In 2011, there were 880 SOEs in coal mining, 312 in steel, and 264 in nonferrous metals processing. China has relied more on greater competition, rather than privatization, to accomplish its transition from plan to market. However, competition only works if losing firms exit the market. Since the conclusion of these reforms in about 2005, state firms have rarely done either because of preferential access to bank credit, rotation of senior executives, and market share protections.
Loyd Eskildson
Dinica Roman BEIJING:
China's Foreign Ministry on Friday accused unidentified people in the
United States of trying to "disturb" social order in Hong Kong, after
the U.S. State Department expressed further concern the territory's
autonomy was being eroded.
The State Department made the comments in its latest report on the former British colony, released on Wednesday. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said that as Hong Kong was a part of China, no other country had a right to interfere in its internal affairs.
"We also remind the United States that certain people on the U.S. side have always wanted to disturb Hong Kong, disturb its socio-economic development, disturb the normal order of its residents' lives, and even use the Hong Kong issue to interfere in China's internal affairs," he told a daily news briefing.
"This can only be futile. The only effect it will have is to cause Chinese people to go on alert and have a bad reaction."
The State Department made the comments in its latest report on the former British colony, released on Wednesday. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said that as Hong Kong was a part of China, no other country had a right to interfere in its internal affairs.
"We also remind the United States that certain people on the U.S. side have always wanted to disturb Hong Kong, disturb its socio-economic development, disturb the normal order of its residents' lives, and even use the Hong Kong issue to interfere in China's internal affairs," he told a daily news briefing.
"This can only be futile. The only effect it will have is to cause Chinese people to go on alert and have a bad reaction."
Dinica Roman http://thebricspost.com/putin-asks-new-china-backed.../
DeniseReply
May 19, 2016 at 5:40 pm
It is a pity that here in Brazil are suffering regressions after the coup on President Dilma. The interim Minister of Foreign Affairs wants to change the direction of multilateralism and to end the BRICs.
DeniseReply
May 19, 2016 at 5:40 pm
It is a pity that here in Brazil are suffering regressions after the coup on President Dilma. The interim Minister of Foreign Affairs wants to change the direction of multilateralism and to end the BRICs.
thebricspost.com
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