Sa schimbam Europa!

Sa schimbam Europa – 9 februarie 2015

Smaranda Dobrescu

Tsipras a facut publica sinteza programului sau de guvernare. Nimic in acesta care sa justifice caracterul radical al stangii: nici macar nu-si propune sa nationalizeze bucati din fostul patrimoniu al statului ajunse ineficiente prin inactiunea noilor patroni. Oare cate din acele masuri generice propuse nu ni s-ar potrivi si noua?. Iata o mostra:
9. A European Glass-Steagall Act. The aim is to separate commercial and investment banking activities and prevent such a dangerous merging of risks into one uncontrolled entity.
10. Effective European legislation to tax offshore economic and entrepreneurial activities.
http://links.org.au/node/3719

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  Prospectiv A-z .
Foarte interesant planul in 10 puncte al lui Tsipras. Miscare ampla si retorica, ar trebui sa fi venit dela Bruxelles pentru a fi altceva.

P.A-z  .
Iata si cele 10 puncte ale sale:


To end the European crisis, we need a policy regime-change. That priority serves our political plan of ten programmatic points:
1. Immediate End to Austerity. Austerity is a harmful medicine at the wrong time with devastating consequences for the cohesion of our societies, for democracy, for the future of Europe. One of the scars of austerity that shows no sign of healing is unemployment – and in particular, youth unemployment. Today, almost 27 million people are unemployed in the European Union out of which more than 19 million in the Eurozone. The official unemployment Eurozone average has risen from 7,8% in 2008 to 12.1% in November 2013. For Greece, from 7.7% to 27.4% and for Spain from 11.3% to 26.7% during the same period. Youth unemployment in Greece and Spain hovers around 60%. With 3,5 million under-25s jobless, Europe pens its own suicide note.
2. A New Deal for Europe. The European economy has suffered six years of crisis, with average unemployment above 12% and the dangers of a 1930s-style deflation on its doorstep. Europe could and should collectively borrow at low interest rates to finance a program of economic reconstruction and sustainable development with emphasis on investment in people, technology and infrastructure. The program would help crisis-hit economies to break free from the vicious circle of recession and rising debt ratios, create jobs and sustain recovery. The USA did it. Why couldn’t we?
3. Credit expansion to small and medium-sized firms. Credit conditions in Europe have deteriorated sharply. Small and medium-sized firms have been hit especially hard. Thousands of them, particularly in the crisis-hit economies of the European south, have been forced to close, not because they were not viable, but because credit dried up. The consequences for jobs have been dire. Extraordinary times require non- conventional action: the European Central Bank should follow the example of other Central Banks around the world and provide cheap credit to banks, if they agree to increase their lending to small and medium-sized enterprises by a corresponding amount.
4. Defeating unemployment. The average European unemployment is today the highest since official records began. Many of the unemployed are without a job for more than a year, while many young people have never had the opportunity to a paid for and fulfilling employment. The bulk of the unemployment problem is the result of slow or negative economic growth. But experience shows that, even if growth in Europe resumes, it will take a long time before unemployment returns to its pre-crisis levels. Europe cannot afford waiting that long. Long spells of unemployment leave permanent scars on the skills and talents of people, especially the young. It feeds right-wing extremism, it undermines democracy and destroys the European ideal. Europe shouldn’t waste time. It should mobilise and redirect Structural Fund resources towards creating meaningful employment opportunities for its citizens. Where the fiscal constraints of member states are binding, national contribution should be set to zero.
5. Suspension of the new European fiscal framework: It requires balanced budgets year-on-year and regardless of the economic conditions that prevail in a member state. It therefore removes the ability to use fiscal policy as a stabilisation policy tool at times of crisis, i.e. at times where it is most needed, and thus puts economic stability at risk. In short, it is a dangerous idea. Europe needs a fiscal framework that acknowledges the need for fiscal discipline in the medium-term, while simultaneously allowing member states to resort to fiscal stimulus in recessions. A cyclically adjusted fiscal policy rule that exempts public investment should be preferred.
6. A genuine European Central Bank – lender of last resort for member states, not only for banks: Historical experience suggests that successful monetary unions require central banks that carry out the entire range of central banking functions and do not focus exclusively on the maintenance of price stability. The commitment to act as lender of last resort should be unconditional and should not depend on a member state’s agreement to a reform program with the European Stability Mechanism. The euro’s fate, and the prosperity of the people of Europe may well depend on this.
7. Macroeconomic readjustment: Surplus countries should do as much as deficit countries to correct macroeconomic imbalances within Europe. Europe should monitor, assess and demand action from current account surplus countries, in the form of stimulus, in order to alleviate the unilateral pressure on deficit countries to contract. The current asymmetry in the adjustment between surplus and deficit countries does not harm the deficit countries alone. It harms Europe as a whole.
8. A European Debt Conference. Our proposal is inspired from one of the most perceptive moments in European political history. Such was the London Debt Agreement of 1953, which essentially relieved Germany of the economic burden of its own past, helped rebuild the post-war German democracy and paved the way for the economic success of that country. The London Debt Agreement required from Germany to pay, at the very most, half of all its debts – private and intergovernmental alike. It tied their repayment schedule to the country’s ability to pay, spreading it over a period of 30 years. That is, it subsumed debt service into economic performance, following an implicit “growth clause”: for the period 1953-1958 only interest payments were due. This delay in making payments on principal was intended to give the country some additional breathing room.
Starting in 1958, the Agreement called for Germany to make annual fixed payments, which became less and less significant as the German economy took off. The Agreement implicitly assumed that reducing German consumption, what is today called “internal devaluation”, was not an acceptable way to ensure repayment of the debts. German payments were, in effect, conditioned on the country’s ability to repay.
The London Debt Agreement clashes with the erroneous logic of the Treaty of Versailles reparations, which seriously undermined the German people’s ability to rebuild the economy and also created doubts about the Allies’ eventual intentions. As such, it remains a useful blueprint for action today. However, we don’t want a European Debt Conference for Europe’s South. We want a European Debt Conference for Europe. In that context, all available policy instruments should be employed, including the European Central bank acting as lender of last resort in that respect, as well as the issuance of socialised European debt, such as Eurobonds, to replace national debt.
9. A European Glass-Steagall Act. The aim is to separate commercial and investment banking activities and prevent such a dangerous merging of risks into one uncontrolled entity.
10. Effective European legislation to tax offshore economic and entrepreneurial activities.

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