sâmbătă, 25 aprilie 2015


Un Prospectiv
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Aici e centrul de greutate.
Vietnam pivots to the United States and fights a little sea battle with China as Beijing pushes to expand its sphere of influence.
NYTIMES.COM|BY ROGER COHEN
  • Un Prospectiv .
    DAVID GEORGE • 2 days ago


    Mead is describing the world as it's playing out to everyone's view and Ikenberry is spinning it to accomplish two things. One is to provide the illusion of a successful U. S. Foreign Policy with competent people at its helm. The second is to show that no matter what we think we're witnessing globally, the spread of liberal democracy is still working so pay no attention to how things look at the moment or what other nations are contentiously but hopelessly doing. How arrogant.

    BING JOU • 4 days ago

    China is a revisionist; albeit, an extremely cautious one. All my Chinese friends with whom I have discussed this topic easily reach a consensus, that is, the current international order will not be accepted by a powerful China even though it may benefit China. I can't say how Russia or India will respond to a liberal order designed and built by the US

    The US builds military alliances around the China, actively pursues her "Pivot to Asia" policy and initiates TPP. All these are done expressly without Chinese participation. The US first wants to consolidate and solidify an international order, which they call status quo. Thereafter, the US will force China to accept the status quo before China becomes to too powerful.

    Chinese are pragmatic, but the US is going to misread Chinese pragmatism. Chinese are lying low, busy building up her strength. Chinese likely takes it as an offense that the US is setting up an international security arrangement without Chinese in Chinese backyard. They will not forget being encircled, belittled and condescended. No matter how much this new order might benefit China, Chinese resentment at the US encirclement will prevail. A powerful China will revise whatever the US is building right now.

    China has been an empire. She lost all her glory since the 1938 Opium War. Chinese are still talking about 200 years of humiliation and looking forward to the return of the empire.

    I don't disagree with the American intention to rearrange an international order in Asia to accommodate a rising China. The US should spend a lot of efforts on Pivot to Asia, but the way Washington DC is approaching this policy is scary. I doubt that 20 years from now China will forget how she is being manhandled by the US.

    I am well versed in Chinese history. There have been too many revanche Chinese patiently waited for a generation or two to carry out. A popular Chinese proverb: It is never too late to avenge 20 years later.

    The author argues that China knows it would be unwise to revise an liberal order. This is a misreading of Chinese. It is likely that Chinese may always believe an order of their very own is preferred to the liberal order arranged by the US. When one believes a revision can be better, one will revise regardless of cost.

    The strategy, as I suspect, in which the US ties herself to Asia is to ensure the US hegemony because the strategy has no contribution from China. One day China will have the capabilities to spoil it. Neither Philippines, nor South Korea, nor Thailand will be able to cause real troubles

  • Un Prospectiv .
    Philippe-Joseph Salazar • 7 days ago


    From an independent critical European perspective, the current state of affairs in Eastern Europe highlights three aspects which the writer chose to set aside. First, there is no natural coincidence of interests between the majors in Europe and the United States. History shows that Europe is best governed when the majors, the UK, France, Germany and Russia find a balance of power to maintain Europe on an even keel. We suffered two wars and an holocaust and the trauma of decolonization partly because of foreign interference or minor powers whose disruptive and sectorial ambitions were not kept in check (Poland is a good example). Second, it is an error to belittle, through rhetoric ("Russia a regional power"), Russia and by labeling ourselves "the West". Russia is also the West. De Gaulle, the last statesman with vision in Europe, had a clear understanding of the place of Russia in Europe, and that was a reason why France remained a nuclear power independent from NATO. Europe's future is together with Russia, in the large Euro-Asian continent that stretches from the Western Approaches to the Aleutians. This is our continent. In that respect Ukraine is an interesting flashpoint: it is a test of power, and clearly the major power that should stay out of European affairs has shown that it lacks the deep historical culture, the flexibility in adapting means to ends, and the resilience true power requests. Thirdly, the liberal order is a grand expression enough to impress the media, but it simply does not exist: it is a rhetorical figment. It is nowhere to be seen at work, except as a cause for illiberal disorder and distress. If I were an American I would wish to have my country, the United States, display effective political leadership, harness a competent political class and succeed in action - something, I regret to say, as a European, I see at work in Russia - a traditional, continental ally, if I may remind readers of this enduring reality. It does not mean we, in Europe, should play along with Russia. No more than we should play along with the United States. The Ukrainian crisis is an opportunity to bring European politics in focus and to affirm that our Continent, our common European house, is for us and us alone to shape, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, if we are to maintain four thousand year of enduring leadership in world affairs, and regain the upper hand we lost, temporarily, in the second half of the 20th century.
    http://www.lesinfluences.fr/_Philippe-Joseph-Salazar-644_
    Philosophe et rhétoricien, ancien élève de la rue...
    LESINFLUENCES.FR

  • Smaranda Dobrescu Un mare admirator al lui Cameron, Salazar recurge uneori in mod justificat si la spusele vesnic valabile ale lui Aristotel. plecand de la definitiile acestuia, Salazar vrea sa descifreze semnele sfarsitului democratiei, stimulat de ceea ce pare din exterior de neacceptat: "Le rhétoricien voit alors proliférer ses signes : dans le langage politique la montée des sophismes, des manipulations de mots et de formules ; dans le débat public la surrection des émotions : on éclate en larmes - comme les étudiants pleurant le jeune homme récemment mort après une castagne de fashionistas gauchos-fachos qui, jadis, n’aurait pas donné lieu à un tel pathos ; on défile en larmoyant ; on se répand en discours fusionnels sur le net ; on invective ; on rage ; on crie ; on se traite de tous les noms ; on appelle à ceci et à cela. Le pathos a remplacé à la fois le logos, ou l’argumentation raisonnable, et l’éthos, ou la dignité du discours. Des trois fonctions fondatrices, rhétoriques, de l’art de la politique que j’évoquais, il n’en reste que la plus lamentable et la plus volatile : le moi des émotions." Acest lucru devine vizibil prin disproportiile ce apar intre componentele corpului social care ajung atat de evidente incat sunt vizibile tuturor: saracia, sentimentul ca rezultatul alegerilor favorizeaza disproportionat un grup in defavoarea altuia si afluxul de straini acceptati initial din ratiuni economice si care obtin treptat drepturi acordate de obicei doar nativilor, provocand acestora din urma reactii de vioelnta fizica si verbala.

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