Gheorghe Gradinaru

May 27, 2014

By George Friedman

I arrived in Bucharest, Romania, the day after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel will be here in a few weeks. The talk in Bucharest, not only among the leadership but also among the public, is about Ukraine. Concerns are palpable, and they are not only about the Russians. They are also about NATO, the European Union, the United States and whether they will all support Romania if it resists Russia. The other side of the equation, of course, is whether Romania will do the things it must do in order to make outside support effective. Biden left Romania with a sense that the United States is in the game. But this is not a region that trusts easily. The first step was easy. The rest become harder.

Borderlands: First Moves in Romania

Romania is depending on consistency from the United States, but with great distance come options and the ability to change one's mind.

STRATFOR.COM

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  Un Prospectiv .
  1) Biden left Romania with a sense that the United States is in the game. But this is not a region that trusts easily. The first step was easy. The rest become harder.
  
  Buuun.
  
  2) What is remarkable about the Romanians is that they are unremarkable. They have emerged from a nightmare inflicted by one of their own and have regained their balance.
  
  Apa de Bucuresti imbata?
  
  3) Above all, it elicits a search for allies, preferably far enough away not to occupy them and strong enough to offer meaningful support. Obviously, the Americans are tailor-made for this role, so long as they don't overstep their bounds and generate fears of domination. 
  
  Cum simt romanii la Pungesti/Rosia Montana despre chestia asta?
  
  4) The Russians can control the tempo of American actions by cooling things down in Ukraine -- or so they think. And this is precisely what worries the Romanians. They see themselves as having a long-term Russian problem.
  
  Cine i-o fi spus asta, vreunul care acopera cu asemenea preocupare alte deficiente?
  
  5) In the course of various conversations I tried to explain my view of the situation. The United States has a pattern of engagement in Europe. It postpones intervention to the last moment, builds alliance structures, supports allies with economic and military aid, and then waits until late in the game to intervene, always hoping it won't have to.
  
  Ca in Ungaria si Cehoslovacia?
  
  6) The Romanians are more comfortable with this than the Poles are, who have asked for 10,000 NATO troops on their territory. The Romanians have no such expectations. They are also prepared to increase their defense budget to 2 percent of gross domestic product, which is significant for Europe these days. But they expect the United States to help finance the cost of the weapons they need to purchase.
  
  Interesant...
  
  7) For now, the Romanians accept this, but their acceptance is fragile. It depends on political consistency on the part of the United States, but with great distance come options and the ability to change one's mind. Romania is here and can't go elsewhere. It can only change alliances and hope for the best, something both sides need to consider.
  
  S-a stiut asta dintotdeauna. Chiar si atunci cand s-a descis destructurarea economica a locului--spre deosebire de ideea din jurul Planului Marshall. Iar acum ne miram ca biciul romanesc nu pocneste?! 
  
  Cine-l plateste p'asta?

  
  
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  Carmen Rodikaa Un Prospectiv: vorbiti ca un roman care pastreaza instinctiv un set de informatii cu care s-a format aici (unreachable pentru oricine altcineva) in timp ce el vorbeste ca un american cu bagajul sau cultural specific, dar care incearca (spre deosebire de multi altii care doar pretind) onest sa inteleaga modul de gandire romanesc.

  
  
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  Carmen Rodikaa Am citit si eu, acum cateva ore, acest articol pe care l-am primit pe mail de la Stratfor si, chiar daca pe alocuri am zambit, am inteles ca omul chiar incearca sa gaseasca niste raspunsuri - erorile vin doar din diferenta de formatie culturala (in spiritul lui Hofstede) mentionata mai sus.

  
  
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  Un Prospectiv .
  Multumesc de observatie; Avantajul celor ca mine este ca suntem bilingvi/biculturali. 
  
  Multe din boacanele politicii externe americane se datoreaza proiectiilor bazate pe ignorarea/(ignoranta?) celorlalte culturi; multe din boacanele interne ale Romaniei se datoreaza nerecunoasterii (importantei rolului) culturii romane in toate cele.
  
  Cele de imediat mai sus creaza premizele unui joc de artificii, in cel mai bun caz. 
  
  Politica externa americana in Romania/zona ar avea de castigat prin includerea unor puncte de vedere mediate din surse mai extinse. Politica romaneasca la randu-i ar avea de castigat prin plecarea dela o re/cunoastere si ASUMARE ale celor romanesti.
  
  La nivel practic, SUA nu se poate nuanta 'la infinit' pentru a acomoda caracteristicile fiecarui colt de lume unde sunt oarece interese americane. Numai ca in momentul in care miza devine reala, fie reusesti sa faci asta, fie esti confruntat cu oportunism. Romanii ar putea ajuta asta crescand inteligent miza americana in ROmania si/sau educandu-si partenerii prin ambasadori formali si informali.

  
  
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  Un Prospectiv .
  Nu stiu cat incearca el raspunsuri vs. cat incearca sa (se) reasigure. Acum aproape un an, lansa o idee conforma careia romanii erau de unii singuri si n-ar fi trebuit sa se amageasca cu NATO. Oricum, intre el si Kaplan, mi-as pune banii pe al doilea ca valoare a observatiilor facute despre restul lumii. Numai ca amandoi fac parte din categoria celor care nu dau prea multi bani pe Romani/a--spun asta nu pentru ca Romania merita apriori cine stie ce din partea neromanilor, ci pentru ca, din exemplele oferite de Larry Watts, am dedus ca SUA a avut un partener organic in Romania. Din cele scrise de dl.Adrian Severin aici, se confirma continuitatea filo-americanismului in Romania, chiar si dupa 1989. De ce sa irosesti chestia asta, de exemplu, pentru cateva gaze de shist?