joi, 18 decembrie 2014

Viktor Orban: “The era of liberal democracies is over”



Viktor Orban: “The era of liberal democracies is over” – 28 iulie 2014


Gheorghe Gradinaru
We will try to find a method of organizing society which differs from dogmatic ideologies accepted in the Western world – a new Hungarian state capable of making our community a competitor once again in the great global race, for the coming decades,” he said.
This new Hungary “will be a new labor state that will respect Christianity, freedom and human rights”. The era of liberal democracies is over, Orbán added, and listed China, India, Russia, Turkey and Singapore as countries that could offer Hungary inspiration. “Our time will come,” he concluded.
Viktor Orban: "The era of liberal democracies is over" - The Budapest Beacon
Hungary PM Viktor Orban announces formation of parliamentary committee to monitor "foreigners who try to gain influence in Hungary".
budapestbeacon.com|De Csaba Tóth
Un Prospectiv .
Ungarii au talentul de a fi devreme la intalnirea cu istoria. In cele din urma, totusi, istoria a trecut pe acolo.
Smaranda Dobrescu Si cum se cheama noua era in care nu mai discutam de drepturile omulu? Sau, macar care ii sunt valorile?
S.D  Pana acum Orban se delimita de Jobbik in aceasta atitudine. Dupa alegeri, aliatul intru politica populara al national liberalilor romani si-a nuantat intentiile in concordanta cu un binecunoscut ideolog pe cat de iubit pe atat de contestat. Iata ce a declarat Orban-amicul dreptei romanest- la Tusnad :"He dismissed the US approach of seeing the spreading of human rights as a principal duty. “Definite, pragmatic and relation-centered” diplomacy should be promoted over “enumerating human rights,” he said. The objective of a “truly national foreign policy” is to make every global player interested “in the country’s success”. IN traducere, asta vrea sa zica daca nu gresesc, inlocuirea drepturilor omului cu drepturile tarilor.
Un. P
Iata si o reactie despre rolul ideologiilor din Romania:

______________

Scena politică şi actorii ei

Scena politică românească se pregăteşte pentru alegerile prezidenţiale. Cea mai mare agitaţie este la "dreapta” spectrului politic. Pun ”dreapta” între ghilimele, pentru că lucrurile trebuie judecate nuanţat. ”Stânga” şi ”dreapta” au acum alt conţinut şi alte conotaţii faţă de ce reprezentau cu ani în urmă. În acest moment, ele descriu mai degrabă iluzii, nu realităţi. Renunţarea la ideologie şi mimarea unor identităţi lipsite de conţinut reprezintă principala slăbiciune a politicii româneşti. De aici şi alianţele sau fuziunile între partide care ar lăsa perplex orice observator obişnuit cu norma.

Nici alianţa spre fuziune dintre PNL şi PDL nu este mai mult decât o încercare de a găsi un vehicul electoral pentru un candidat încă nenumit, al unei părţi a forţelor politice româneşti. Acest vehicul electoral poate funcţiona, sau nu. Nu există garanţii în acest sens. Experienţa eşuată a altor construcţii de acest gen stă mărturie: Alianţa Dreptate şi Adevăr nu a funcţionat mai mult decât USL. şi încă nenumitul partid ”de dreapta” are toate şansele să sucombe înainte de a se naşte, în funcţie de rezultatul alegerilor prezidenţiale.

Ideologiilor clasice, care nu sunt moarte, ci doar trec printr-un proces de aducere la zi, li se substituie, în grabă, una sui-generis: cea a puterii. De fapt, toată zbaterea politicului are un singur obiectiv: cucerirea puterii. După care nu mai urmează nimic. Iar dacă ”puterea” este exercitată şi se împarte între mai mulţi, atunci eşecul este garantat, oricât de zdrobitor ar fi fost scorul electoral al respectivei alianţe.

Aceasta este principala cauză a proastei guvernări. Pentru că a lua puterea este fără îndoială un obiectiv al oricărui partid politic. Dar a exercita puterea, în logica servirii interesului public, înseamnă a guverna bine. De asta mulţi se întreabă cât din agenda publică se regăseşte pe agenda viitorului partid ”de dreapta”. Pentru că el s-a format prin voinţa unor lideri, efemeri, până la urmă. Nu s-a văzut prea mult entuziasm la baza forţelor ”coagulate”. Dimpotrivă. Deci ce şanse sunt ca această construcţie să aibă o viaţă mai lungă decât precedentele?

Soluţia ar fi întoarcerea la ideologii, şi renunţarea la a face din partide doar simple instrumente pentru a beneficia de ”plăcerile” guvernării. Când va fi clară diferenţa dintre stânga şi dreapta, când va fi clar ale cui interese sunt promovate de fiecare partid, abia atunci vom avea premisele însănătoşirii scenei politice româneşti. Până atunci va fi doar un trist carnaval al alianţelor ce se nasc şi pier.

Ion Iliescu
S.D   Regimul domnului Orbán nu este fascist.Nu inca. http://www.criticatac.ro/.../regimul-domnului-orban-nu.../
criticatac.ro
Un.P .
Sa ne uitam si la ce face Orban, nu numai la ce zice Tamas despre el:

http://www.zf.ro/.../statul-ungar-a-cheltuit-4-miliarde...

O fi de bine, o fi de rau? Eu unul nu prea ma uit la ce zice, ca-s altii mai atenti care i-ar fi atras atentia pana acum--vezi cum se intampla in Romania. Ma uit la ce face si ma intreb, o fi de bine, o fi de rau?
S.D  Despre ce a facut Orban bine pentru Ungaria am vorbit de cateva ori. A lucrat in interesul maghiarilor, s-a luptat sa pastreze pamanturile, s-a scuturat de jugul FMI. Aici, daca respectam subiectul postarii e vorba de schimbarea tipului de societate, deci despre abordarea unei alte ideologii. Din acest punct de vedere s-ar putea discuta macar aspectele avute in vedere in privinta Romaniei daca nu si cele cu impact european:
"Că își dorește enclave maghiare etnice și autonome în Transilvania (ceea ce deja a provocat o furtună de indignare și de sentimente naționaliste anti-maghiare în România, felicitări).

Pe scurt, Dl. Orbán a hotărât că el și guvernul său și cu statul pe care-l conduce de unul singur sunt cu siguranță la extrema dreaptă, ceea ce o dovedesc și reabilitarea regimului autoritar de dinainte de război, promovarea unor figuri publice anti-semite și rasiste pe poziții înalte, precum și un discurs etnicist sălbatic împotriva a) Occidentului, b) vecinilor noștri, „statelor succesoare” și c) romilor și evreilor."
Un .P
Nefiind un juriu literar, ma intereseaza mai putin ce zic politicienii. De exemplu, politicienii romani zic numai de bine. Problema fundamentala atunci devine: Care este relatia intre vorbe si fapte?

De exemplu, cand un oficial strain declara chestia aia cu enclavele pe teritoriul romanesc, m-as astepta ca politicienii romani sa INTERZICA accesul acelui oficial in Romania. Asta pentru inceput.
S.D  Daca presupunem ca spre deosebire de politicienii romani Orban ar fi capabil sa si faca ceea ce spune, atunci conform declaratiilor sale Ungaria va renunta la constitutionalitate, separarea puiterilor,drepturile fundamentale,domnia legii, libertate, egalitate. Sa spunem ca toate acestea ar vorbi de un regim totalitar dictatorial. Ce se faca insa vecinii unguri cu ideea neoliberala ca nu se va acorda ajutor social celor care au nevoie dar sunt in incapacitate de munca, ci doar celor care muncesc deja? Nu este asta principiul clar al neolibilor ca oamenii care nu reusesc sunt vinovati de lene, ingalare, rea vointa?
Un .P  Omul parca tocmai a castigat niste alegeri. Dupa cum spuneam la inceput, ungurii, ca neam, par a fi sistematic devreme la intalnirea cu istoria.

Dpdv al romanilor, a te uita la vorbele Orbanului, nu (si) la fapte, mi se pare o DISTRACTIE. Eu faptele le-as cantari, cu bune si rele, abia dupa aceea as urmari sa vad daca vorbele sunt suport real sau disimulare.
S.D  Desi discursul lui Orban este clar fascistoid, Tamas crede ca inca nu s-a ajuns acolo.
Un.P Foarte buna observatia! Intr-adevar, spre deosebire de romani, ungur la ungur nu-si scoate ochii. In plus, ca si la germani, ungurii sunt mai intai unguri, pentru Ungaria, abia dupa aceea sunt din partide diferite etc.
Un.P .
Orban are companie sau despre originile malthusiene ale solutiilor la criza capitalista...

http://www.bioedge.org/.../bioethics/bioethics_article/11071
S.D  Incredibil!
Un.P Iata inca o perspectiva:

http://youtu.be/1W_LFjDUwqI...
S.D  "dl. Diaconescu vrea asadar sa arate ca are un avantaj fata de ceilalti candidati, facand, pentru cucerirea sufletelor, alba-neagra cu Ardealul. Oare cat s-a gandit inainte sa slobozeasca porumbelul? In mod sigur a avut in minte stransa sa colaborare cu Fundatia germana "Konrad Adenauer". Aceasta alonja a Ministerului de Externe al Germaniei care finanteaza miscarea FIDESZ, a premierului Ungariei, il curteaza de ceva vreme si pe mladiosul Cristian Diaconescu. Relatia cu bastionul dogmatic al spatiului vital german a atins in mai a.c. un nou punct culminant: La propunerea iepurelui (patruped cu urechi mari, caruia ii tremura blanita zarindu-si umbra printre tufe) prezidenatial, domnul Traian Basescu i-a conferit lui Hans-Gert Pottering, presedinte al Fundatiei "Konrad Adenauer", Ordinul National "Steaua României" — în grad de mare subofiter. "
http://www.corectnews.com/.../de-ce-nu-este-cristian...
"Twaddle tendency" se numeste in stiinta fenomenul...
corectnews.com
S.D  Sintagma euro-atlantica apare din ce in ce ca un produs expirat,Pana mai ieri Cristian Diaconescu il invinuia pe Ponta ca se uita spre rasarit. Preferatul lui Konrad Adenauer la presedentie ar trebui sa se mai reoreinteze si de jure, caci si asa se pare ca el inca nu a fost in vizita La Washington. De exemplu, puternicul Frunzaverde a marturisit ca l-a insotit pe Predoiu intr-o vizita discreta la "licurici" Cred ca a dorit sa ne aduca aminte de omnipotenta dumisale, in stare sa prezinte Americii predoiul-candidat.
S.D  Tot la Balvanyos, Laszlo Tokes incurajat de reformistul Orban a declarat: “Autonomia teritorială a Ardealului şi a Partiumului trebuie să se înfăptuiască, iar unitatea militară secuiască înfiinţată în timpul lui Bela Kun trebuie să ne fie exemplu, la nevoie!”,

Formaţiunea militară menţionată este cea care a ucis şi maltratat români după Unirea de la 1918, fiind alungată ulterior de armata română din Transilvania

Mai mult: http://www.libertatea.ro/.../laszlo-toekes-cerut...
“Autonomia teritorială a Ardealului şi a Partiumului...
libertatea.ro
S.D  Occidentul pare sa reactioneze intr-un sfarsit la raspandirea ideilor non-liberale: http://online.wsj.com/.../hungarys-illiberal-turn-1406829873
The Wall Street Journal deplores Hungary's illiberal...
online.wsj.com
S.D  Oare cine incurajeaza si da garantii Ungariei sa procedeze in felul acesta fata de Romania? Iar devenim miza jocului altora?
budapestbeacon.com|De Csaba Tóth
S.D  Teza de baza pe care isi construieste Orban nevoia schimbarii tipului de societate nu este lipsita de interes si suna cam asa: In Ungaria democratia liberala a fost incapabila sa protejeze proprietatea publica, esentiala in sustinerea natiunii si nu a aparat-o de indatorare Este adevarat ca el nu vorbeste de statul natiune ci de natiunea maghiara care include si diaspora. Daca asta este motivul schimbarii radicale care serveste excelent celor ce decurg de aici si enumerate de noi mai sus, atunci ma intreb cine a obligat ungurii sa privatizeze tot? Au fost ei la fel de docili precum romanii in a asculta sfaturi din departari? Nu a fost Fidesz-ul la putere inca din 2000 daca nu ma insel? Nu erau crestin democratii cei care sustineau proprietatea privata ca un bun esential? De ce nu l-au sustinut pe Megessy care era temperat in instrainarea societatilor, companiilor, regiilor nationale? Se poate accepta ca Orban a realizat ca s-a facut o mare greseala Dar se poate accepta si ca aceasta gaselnita il ajuta in adunarea natiunii maghiare,sub un regim de forta indulcit de promisiunea unirii sub stindardul marii natiuni.Faptul ca mai exista astfel de idei si in rasarit nu pare a fi o pura intamplare.
Un.P  "the votes of those Hungarians who live abroad were needed to gain the two-thirds majority of the national forces in the Hungarian parliament."

Rezoneaza cu victoria lui Basescu?

"Very briefly: In America, the President of the US has made numerous and repeated statements regarding how America has been engulfed by cynicism, and the task for American society and the American government is to declare war on cynicism originating from the financial sector. Before 2008, such a statement would have resulted in exclusion from gentlemanlike international discourse, additionally because of the characteristics of the financial system, it would probably have even been tainted with as being sinister, making any utterance of such sentences extremely perilous. Contrary to this, these ideas constantly appear in the American press as of late. The US president says that if a hardworking American constantly has to choose between career and family, that America will lose its place in the world economy. Or the President openly speaks about economic patriotism. He says such sentences that would still earn beating and stoning in today’s provincial Hungarian public life. For example, he openly speaks about how companies employing foreigners should pay their fair share in taxes. Or he openly speaks about how companies employing Americans should be supported before anyone else. These are all voices, ideas and sentences that would have been unimaginable six or eight years earlier."

Politicienii ungari citesc presa americana cu ochii lor, nu le vin sumare de la 'experti'. Orban intelege ca lumea a plecat in 2008 dintr-o statie. La Bucuresti, avantul este sa ajunga in acea statie.

"In my opinion, the most provocative and exciting question surfacing in the Western world during the last year can be summarized as follows, applying necessary simplification: competition existing among nations in the world, competition existing among alliances, and forces of the world has been supplemented by a new element. [...] Yet there is an even more important race. I would articulate this as a race to invent a state that is most capable of making a nation successful."

Hai sa gandim impreuna despre aceasta teza!

"We needed to state that a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy. Moreover, it could be and needed to be expressed, that probably societies founded upon the principle of the liberal way to organize a state will not be able to sustain their world-competitiveness in the following years, and more likely they will suffer a setback, unless they will be able to substantially reform themselves."

Acesta este un pariu pe care-l face Orban in numele Ungariei?

"Instead the principle should be that do not do to others what you would not do to yourself."

L-a citit si pe Taleb. Desi nu-i necesar, acesta fiind un fundament al legii morale din timpuri imemoriale.

"I saw that that we are talking about hundreds of people here that deal with distributing resources of economic or social development from the EU that Hungary is entitled to (these resources do not come as a gift – as I said we are entitled to them) receive their salaries directly from the EU. Consequently, an extraterritoriality-situation came about in Hungary. Then it turned out from the numbers, that these salaries are 4-5, but often 8 times more than for employees in the Hungarian administration. This means that Hungary was living for 7 years, that such people decided on the majority of resources at the country disposal, who were paid by other people, and received a multiple of what Hungarian administration employees would receive for that job. Similarly, out of 100 forints going from there to the Hungarian economic life 35% could be invoiced as so-called “soft expense”. So for expenses that were not closely related to the objective of the grant, but only connected to it: preparation, analysis, planning, and all kinds of things, advising, for example."

Aha! Populism sau realism?

Observatii:
1) Nu cred ca Ungaria e singura care-si descrie experienta recenta in termenii acestia--adica nu ne uitam la o problematica preponderent maghiara.
2) Nu cred ca Ungaria e singura care-si descrie solutiile in felul acesta, nu stiu nici macar daca este prima.
3) Ungarii ar putea fi printre primii in UE care sa articuleze PUBLIC o asemenea agenda si care sa treaca la executia ei.
4) Desi alte tari UE nu au asemenea agende publice, cumva, actiunile lor indica directii similare.
5) In Romania, discursul politic public este extrem de precar, ca si cum lucrurile ar fi inghetat in timp. Sa fie asta expresia exlcusiva a elitei romanesti sau sa se fi pus si aceasta pe treaba numai ca in mod discret?
6) Sunt ungurii mai temperamentali sau mai vizionari decat romanii? Vizionarismul lor i-a costat in comparatie cu romanii. Dar acelasi vizionarism i-a facut coabitanti intr-un condominium imperial pentru sute bune de ani.

P.S. Da, am vazut ca dl. Orban incurajeaza gandirea... prospectiva.
S.D  Textul lui Orban la o a doua citire constat ca are anumite calitati:
1. In primul rand ridica problema necesitatii schimbarii unor elemente ale statului si a unor reforme pentru ca adecvarea politica sa insoteasca benefic etapa economica. Probleme doctrinare, de adecvare, de reforma nu trec prin capul decidentilor romani nici daca printr-o minune li s-ar pune in functiune senzorii de realitate;
2 Gandirea renationalizarii controlului national asupra unor sectoare economice; iIn primul rand banci cu capital autohton.
3. Renuntarea la ONG-urile finantate din surse straine.

Metodele de punere in aplicare, tipul de societate propus , insa.....
Lamuritor mi se pare textul : "Until the last decade
or so history was familiar with essentially two types of
states, democratic and non-democratic. Now we have a
third, a hybrid, which we might at a pinch also define as
non-democratic democracies. Russia, Iran, Iraq,
Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, the former Ukraine, Georgia,
are concrete examples. What do these regimes have in
common? They have ‘elected’ leaders. That’s the
democratic part. Virtually every other aspect of their
governance structure looks a lot like authoritarianism run
rampant.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2014/07/31/thenew-
wave-of-elected-dictatorships-around-the-world/
The New Wave Of Elected Dictatorships Around
The World
S.D  In final as adauga ca statul lui Orban capabil sa faca competitiva natiunea ungara ne-ar atinge in mod direct si pe noi.., intr-o maniera pe care prefer sa nu o discut.
Un.P  "Gandirea renationalizarii controlului national asupra unor sectoare economice; iIn primul rand banci cu capital autohton."

se pare ca la momentul acesta el vede nationalizarea ca o conduita catre proprietari unguri. e foarte interesant acest punct de vedere: oligarhii locali sunt buni!
S.D  via Zoe Petre Unde e reacția dlor Băsescu, Blaga, Iohannis, Cristian Diaconescu și a celorlalți Populari/populiști din România?
http://www.portfolio.hu/.../global_press_condemns...
Francis Fukuyama, a renowned U.S. economist and...
portfolio.hu
Un.P  Democratia si liberalismul sunt AMANDOUA in criza. Numai ca Fukuyama prezicea acum +2 decade ca liberal democratia marcheaza sfarsitul istoriei. Poate Fukuyama acum oferi solutii pentru crizele liberalismului si democratiei?

Cautarile lui Orban pot fi naive sau perverse, numai ca ele cauta sa ofere o alternativa scufundarii societatii contemporane sub presiunile Crizei.

___________

P.S. Reactia elitei dela Bucuresti? Pai n-a venit factorul postal inca.
S.D  Era mai ales de interes sa aflam reactia popularilor/colegi/prieteni/sustinatori in campanie ai lui Orban din Romania.. Ce sa-i reprosam lui Fukuyama cand nici Habermas sau alti ganditori mai apropiati de puls nu pun degetul pe rana?
Adrian H. Todea Discursul lui Orban de la Baile Tusnad, avandu-l la dreapta sa pe Laszlo Tokes, arata cat de vulnerabila a devenit Romania.
Un.P
Buna observatie, Adrian! In Romania, orice [...] poate spune orice, atat timp cat vine dela vest...
S.D  "Dacă am califica discursul de la Tușnad al premierului maghiar Victor Orban drept ceea ce este – respectiv o pledoarie de inspirație neaoș fascistă – nimeni nu ar clipi și nu am vedea în jur prea multe sprâncene ridicate. Aceasta este, de fapt, schimbarea fundamentală la care dl Orban face aluzie fără să o și definească așa cum trebuie: omul de rând este atât de nemulțumit de democrația neo-conservatoare și de capitalismul neo-liberal încât nu îi mai este teramă de resuscitarea ideologiei de extremă dreaptă – anti-democratică, anti-liberală, anti-socială și anti-personalistă – și privește cu interes – dacă nu chiar cu simpatie – perspectiva unei mișcări retragrade cu față revoluționară către dictatură. Teroarea pieței face preferabilă teroarea statului iar haosul libertății face atractivă disciplina dictaturii."



Reaua vestire dupa Victor Orban"-Adrian Severin
http://pefacebook.blogspot.ro/.../reaua-vestire-dupa...
pefacebook.blogspot.com
ungaria a ratat toate momentele importante ale secolului xx, politica externa fiind falimentara, atat in...
vot.ro
Un.P  "Problema Romaniei in acest context este ca Uniunea Europeana nu considera apropierea Ungariei de Rusia si cererile iredentiste din Transilvania o problema de luat in seama."

De cand problemele Romaniei au tinut agenda Uniunii Europene? De fapt, mai exista Uniunea Europeana dincolo de interesul celor mari, disimulat prin intermediul acestui construct?
S.D  Poate mi-a scapat mie, dar fata de importanta discursului lui Orban m-as fi asteptat ca oficialitatile noastre sa aibe o reactie. Sau poate considera ca nu ne atinge in nici un fel?
Viorel Straoanu E mai bine sa fie ignorat,sa nu i se dea apa la moara.
Miki Marinescu-Colea Domnul Soros!
S.D  Poate reusiti sa-mi dati o explicatie, stimati prospectivi, de ce in cursul zilei de azi mai multi brasoveni au primit telefoane prin care erau intrebati, ca un fel de sondaj daca cunosc limba maghiara.
M.M.C  Acum 4 luni se vehicula pe line o petiție de dezlipire a Transilvaniei de România, petiție scrisă în limba maghiară, pe care o semnau culmea, și români, sub ideea ca s-au săturat ca Transilvana sa îngrașe Bucureștiul!
S.D  Cel putin in Brasov populatia este foarte eterogena, imbogatita in timp cu multime de moldoveni. Populatia maghiara este sub 20%

duminică, 7 decembrie 2014

Larry Watts raspunde punctual observatiilor lui Petre Opris

Dl. Larry Watts raspunde in engleza, observatiilor d-lui Petre Opris, facute pe romaneste.  Formatarea apartine d-lui Watts.

______________________________


Problema „Larry L. Watts”
Detaliile din cărţile publicate de Larry L. Watts demonstrează că nu cunoaşte toate aspectele problemelor pe care le abordează.
RE: My Knowledge
I would like to stipulate from the very beginning that I most assuredly do not know all of the aspects of the problems that I broach in my books. However, I do know something of all of them and a good deal about some of them. I began studying the Soviet bloc in 1975 and Romania more specifically in 1978. I remained academically and then professionally occupied with it ever since, catching the last 21 years of the Cold War and observing – from time to time at first hand – Romania’s role in it. I have conducted research on various aspects of it, particularly Romanian foreign and security policy and, especially when working for U.S. “think tanks,” on its military and security services. So, I presume to believe I might make a useful contribution on this topic.
Nu ştiu dacă el a greşit sau traducătorul, însă amănuntele pe care vi le-am semnalat mi-au sărit în ochi.
Re: Translation and Editing
I would also like to stipulate that there are indeed many errors, even in the original English, to which I made an errata sheet including some 80 such errors. The work has not yet benefited from a professional editing. There are, naturally, errors in the Romanian version and, yes, I was not able to do a proper editing job on that either (volume II is actually in worse state than volume I). I would have preferred that the situation stood otherwise but, as is so often the case, life is what happens when you are making other plans.
Part of the translation/editing problem that is quite serious is the fact that, although my bibliography of some 50 pages appears in Fereste-ma, Doamne, De Prieteni (it is on pages 717-771, before the index, for those who have had difficulty finding it), somewhere along the line (typesetters, printers, etc.) it was left out entirely of the second volume Extorting Peace/Cei Dintai Vor Fi Cei Din Urma. I was unaware of this until I saw what I thought were bizarre allegations that my work had no bibliography. Well, as it turns out, the Romanian version of what is titled in English “Extorting Peace: Romania and the End of the Cold War, 1978-1989” has no bibliography. I will see to it that it is corrected in future editions. Also odd, the original English version has the bibliography idiosyncratically placed AFTER the index. And so it goes.
Cronologia elementară scârţie şi orice istoric ştie faptul că fundamentul unei opere se creează cu ajutorul cronologiei. În concluzie, Larry L. Watts nu prezintă încredere, deşi a indicat foarte multe surse documentare. Practic, a inundat cititorul cu asemenea surse – în opinia mea, într-un mod propagandistic. O carte de 700 de pagini impresionează prin dimensiunile sale şi cititorii obişnuiţi pot spune fără să citească: „Da, omul acesta a făcut o carte bună”.
Recenzia pe care am făcut-o, la cea de-a doua carte a sa, am trimis-o deja în România.
RE: Chronology and Propaganda
I don’t understand what the criticism is regarding chronology. Perhaps it might be explained more clearly?
Likewise, if you can specify the propaganda or the propagandistic aim then I might be able to respond. However, your current formulation is so vague that it doesn’t qualify for much beyond innuendo.
The first volume, by the way, is 795 pages and not 700 pages, so non-readers impressed by size (ahem) should be more impressed still.
Nu am dorit să scriu despre sistemul de propagandă „în buclă” pe care Larry L. Watts l-a folosit din plin şi în prima sa carte. Spaţiul tipografic al unei reviste este limitat şi, pe de altă parte, nu doresc să îi fac de râs pe Larry L. Watts şi Ioan Talpeş. Am înţeles că lui Larry Watts îi place în România şi doreşte să fie prieten al românilor, aşa că evit să spun tot ceea ce cred despre operele sale.
RE: Concern for My Reputation
First, please, say something concrete about the system of propaganda “in bucla” so that I will know my transgression. Secondly, I promise you, I love a good laugh. I plan on having one at your expense.
And please, do not worry about Ioan Talpes. He assumes all responsibility for his “Foreword” to my book and can certainly take care of himself.
You misapprehend me. I do not desire any more friends. I desire the respect of people whom I respect. But even they have my permission and encouragement to say what they think and to point out my errors. I am so dedicated to getting it right that I will even take the extreme measure of changing my mind when faced with persuasive evidence. And I am especially interested in hearing such opinions from persons whose knowledge and judgment have been confirmed repeatedly.
Aşa se cuvine din punct de vedere politic.
L-am întrebat public pe Mark Kramer, la conferinţa de la Leuven (Belgia), ce părere are despre sursele utilizate de Larry L. Watts în cărţile sale? El a răspuns într-un mod diplomatic. Nu l-a criticat pe Watts, ci a spus că, prin ideile sale, Watts susţine reabilitarea lui Ion Antonescu şi Nicolae Ceauşescu. Sunt două chestiuni de care Watts este foarte ataşat în cercetarea sa.
Re: Mark Kramer and Rehabilitation
This is deserving of a separate blog, so I will return to this in the near future. However, I cannot resist asking. Who, in your opinion, are the two most controversial characters of Romania history of the 20th Century and what might be ‘strange’ about an historical researcher being drawn to a controversial topic?
Şi eu am observat acelaşi lucru. În plus, Larry L. Watts critică într-un mod voalat sau direct anumiţi analişti americani: Ronald Asmuss, A. Ross Johnson, Douglas Clarke, Mark Kramer, Juliana Pilon şi Vojtech Mastny.
Re: Ronald Asmus, Ross Johnson, Douglas Clarke, Mark Kramer, Juliana Pilon and Vojtech Mastny
I have criticized none of these persons. However, I have taken issue with some aspect or detail of their work, which is how the process of academic debate functions. Just as I permit and encourage (hopefully useful) criticism of my own work I also feel invited to provide constructive criticism – or at least to ask difficult questions regarding – the work of others. Ron and I had many go rounds when we worked together at Radio Free Europe in the mid-1980s, when we worked together at RAND in the late 1980s, and when he was in charge of NATO enlargement and sold on the idea that only the Visegrad Group should be admitted and I was working on NATO integration and military reform in Romania and had a very different opinion. Likewise, Ross and I go back to the same period at RFE and he is one of the reasons I went to RAND. A couple of years ago we – Ross and I – were on a panel at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars together with Mark Kramer and Vojtech Mastny (and the CIA officer who ran Colonel Kuklinski in Poland). The video of that panel is on the Wilson Center website and my written presentation is at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/larry-watts.
Mark Kramer and I have locked horns on several occasions, most recently, two weeks ago in San Antonio, Texas – he maintaining there is “absolutely clarity” Romania was advocating foreign military intervention against Poland in August 1989 and me pointing out that all of his sources are Soviet, Polish or Hungarian whereas all the Romanian sources adamantly exclude any form of foreign military intervention. With Kramer, as with Vojtech Mastny, my disagreements are with their conclusions and aspects their work and they do not take my questions and differences of opinion as personal attacks. I have indeed criticized Juliana Pilon’s short pieces from the second half of the 1980s at the Heritage Foundation claiming that Romania was a Soviet Trojan horse, just as I have when Ion Mihai Pacepa, Vladimir Tismaneanu, or Ambassador David Funderburk made the same claims before the archival avalanches of the new millennium. The claims were originally made when there was no access to the relevant archives. Only someone dedicated to an agenda having absolutely nothing to do with historical truth would continue to affirm the same today. I cannot recall taking issue with any of Douglas Clarke’s work, but, if I thought it wrong-headed, I surely would have in open discussion.
Totodată, Larry L. Watts a scris de mai multe ori „Constantin şi Olteanu (2013)”, deşi sursa corectă este evidentă. „generalul Constantin Olteanu”.
Oare toată lumea a greşit şi doar Larry L. Watts are dreptate? Nu cred aşa ceva. Experienţa îmi spune că „este ceva putred în Danemarca”.
RE: “Constantin si Olteanu”
Really? I would refer you to the section on Translation/Editing. But if your experience as taught you to use this as a basis of “proof” that “something is rotten in Denmark,” you should get out more.
Dacă am încercat un contact cu Watts?
Am discutat în primăvara anului 2012 cu domnul A. Ross Johnson la Centrul „Woodrow Wilson” deoarece s-a arătat interesat de opiniile mele despre prima carte publicată de Larry L. Watts în România. I-am pus la dispoziţie materialul pe care l-aţi primit şi dvs. şi mi-a spus că îl va aduce la cunoştinţa lui Larry Watts.


RE: You and Ross Johnson at the Wilson Center
I have met with Ross virtually every year, often on more than one occasion, both here in Romania and in the United States, since 1987. I spent a month a few desks away from him in November 2013 when both of us were Wilson Center Scholars. He gave my books a sterling review on Radio Romania Bucuresti last year (October 13, 2013, 2100 hr) We had a couple of conversations at a conference two weeks ago (November 19-22) in San Antonio.
Funny, he didn’t mention you. Nor did he ever feel it necessary to pass on anything you might have given him.
În concluzie, Larry Watts nu a avut un redactor de carte care să elimine greşelile de cronologie etc. Nu ştiu dacă Watts a scris cărţile respective sau au fost „ajutat” de Ioan Talpeş, preluând masiv din ideile vehiculate de fostul şef al SIE.
Subiectul acesta nu mă interesează în mod deosebit deoarece nu am timp să mă ocup în detaliu de operele altora. Le analizez, le utilizez şi, pentru prieteni, îmi exprim punctele de vedere. Time is money!


RE: Regarding authorship
The jury is in. The 17th Earl of Oxford wrote it.
And I would still like to hear the nature of my chronological problem (other than the fact that I am getting much too old for this).
Cheers,
Larry Watts

LARRY L. WATTS continua dialogul inceput la Grupul Prospectiv

Domnul Larry Watts ne-a trimis urmatorul mesaj, in continuarea discutiei noastre inceputa la Grupul Prospectiv pe facebook.  Discutia initiala este disponibila aici si aici.
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First off, let me say that the discussion I have read on your blog has been admirable, with very many points well worth discussion. I hope to address many of them. For now, however, there are a few points that I would like to clarify and considerations I would like to introduce (although some of them have already been raised by your readers in other contexts.) My statement, “In mid-1965 Romania was ‘abruptly’ dropped from Warsaw Pact war planning altogether,”     is made on the basis of a Parallel History Project Hungarian study on Soviet war planning.  Since this was a measure undertaken without informing the Romanians, one would require additional evidence from Soviet or other loyalist member sources to falsify it. Evidence of Romania’s continued participation in map exercises regarding defensive operations, as you rightly point out, does not negate its exclusion from offensive war planning. There are several issues involved here. First, Romania’s exclusion from offensive war planning, the evidence for which I cited Imre Okvath, the former head of the Analysis Department in Hungary’s Office of History and current chief of the Main Department of Science at the Historical Archive of the State Security in Hungary. According to Dr. Okvath’s study of Warsaw Pact war planning (at http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_wargame/introduction_okvath.cfm?navinfo=16606):
Interestingly, until 1965 the Hungarian 5th army was expected to work in close cooperation with the Romanian 3rd army in all military manoeuvers and operational plans; afterward, the Romanian armed forces abruptly disappeared from the scene. This abrupt change in Warsaw Pact military planning can be explained by the emergence of a new political line followed by the Romanian leadership now headed by Nicolae Ceauşescu. This was aimed at fostering the idea of national sovereignty within the alliance and trying to gain national control over nuclear weapons, while at the same time the new leadership declared the policy of working for the elimination of the two opposing military blocs. Since none of these ideas were welcomed by the Soviets at the time, this resulted in a special treatment of the Romanian armed forces as far as military planning was concerned from this time on.”
Any evidence from Romanian sources – military or otherwise – is of the wrong sort to falsify this. One would require more compelling evidence from the other Pact members at the time (for example, from the Soviet-era, Polish, East German or Czech or Slovak archives) or contrary evidence from the Hungarian archives.
Verification of Romania’s lack of serious military cooperation from Romanian archival sources, other Pact – including Soviet - sources, and from American sources during 1964-1966 is plentiful.  It was even plastered on the front page of the New York Times (e.g. December 19, 1964; May 14-18 and 22, 1966). And it was far worse than mere “lack of cooperation,” it had become an active effort to constrain the USSR’s unilateral use of the military force of the Warsaw Pact. As I note in the book, in July 1965 Ceausescu told Deng Xiaopeng that Romania “intended to do away with” Soviet control of the national armies in the Warsaw Pact (see the document in the collection by Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu and Anna Locher at http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=16325&navinfo=15342).
A month earlier, in June 1965, Sherman Kent, the chief analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency and the head of its Office of National Estimates from 1953 until 1968, captured Romanian thinking and the dilemma it posed for Moscow with extraordinary insight. This document was not available to me when I wrote With Friends Like These/Fereste-ma, Doamne, de prieten, so, with your indulgence, I append some sections of it here (the paper, which was for CIA internal distribution only, is titled “Staff Memorandum No. 24-65: Rumania and the Warsaw Pact, 25 June 1965” is available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/5166d4f899326091c6a606e3.)
Certainly the evidence suggests that Bucharest would at least like to leave the Pact, and certainly, if it should do so, the repercussions would transcend the purely local… [T]hey almost certainly view the Pact as another Soviet device for insuring Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and as another instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the member states. …
Moscow’s ability to alter the Rumanian attitude is probably quite limited. Should Bucharest reduce its participation in the Pact to a purely formal level, refuse to participate in Pact exercises and make only a minimal contribution to Pact forces, Moscow would either have to tacitly acknowledge Rumania’s sovereign right to do so, change its plans for the Pact as a whole (as in fact it did for the CMEA when faced with comparable Rumanian opposition), or seek somehow to compel the Rumanians to acquiesce in Soviet plans.
The latter would be most difficult to accomplish. The Soviets almost certainly do not possess sufficient assets within the Rumanian party to overthrow the present regime. Nor do they possess a throttlehold on the Rumanian economy. Bucharest is probably in a better position to resist Soviet economic pressures than either China or Yugoslavia were; in any case, a Soviet boycott would almost certainly turn the Rumanians toward the West for help. A withdrawal of Soviet military aid would probably have the same effect. A Soviet bribe, such as a major economic aid program, would also be unlikely to work. The Rumanian leaders are not the sort who would be likely to barter their independence, even were they in great need of outside economic assistance. …
[T]here is one very telling reason why the Soviets might actually use force in the event that Romania was, in effect, defecting from the camp (by withdrawing from the Pact or in some other way): to preserve their empire, not only in Rumania but throughout Eastern Europe. A failure to intervene would signal to the other Eastern European states and, indeed, to the world at large, that the USSR had either deliberately decided to let the empire break up or that it was powerless to prevent it. …
The nature of the general Soviet dilemma is most clear in this context. An invasion of Rumania is most clear in this context. An invasion of Rumania would in many respects damage Soviet interests throughout the area and would carry with it at least the risk of trouble elsewhere in the Bloc.”

Romania did indeed think about leaving the alliance from 1964 on-and-off until the end of the 1960s/beginning of the 1970s. However, the central question – “Will it improve the security situation of Romania?” – could never be answered positively. NATO never offered it an alternative and was quite explicit on the impossibility of such a consideration (regardless of the fact that Bucharest actually concluded a friendship and assistance alliance with NATO member Portugal in the mid-1970s; a unique occurrence in the Warsaw Pact). Had Romania left the Pact it would have remained in the same geographic space with the same three Warsaw Pact members encircling it, only, instead of being allies – even if purely pro forma – they would be open adversaries. And, instead of the limited access to information and planning that membership afforded it, Romania would be completely blind and deaf to the inner workings of their alliance. 
Thus, Bucharest decided to remain in the Pact, but on ROMANIAN rather than SOVIET terms. Bodnaras clearly stated this to U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes in March 1974, as I note in my book. The Soviet interest in keeping Romania a member of the alliance was also paramount, surmounting even public challenges to Soviet authority and active obstruction of its foreign and security policies and even military operations (for example, in the Middle East). Participation in Pact exercises that didn’t contravene Romanian policy – i.e. non-offensive operations – was one way in which Romania ‘proved’ its on-going membership. Another was participation in Pact and Soviet-sponsored meetings, although often the participation in non-Pact and especially ideological meetings was only pro forma, the Romanian delegation would often leave after the opening ceremony. Moscow, in contrast, would seek to portray them as enthusiastic participants.
How did Romania’s de facto withdrawal while remaining a member of the Pact play out with the Soviet Union, and especially the Soviet military? There are a variety of sources on this, ranging from the State Department and CIA reports of 1964/1965 to the memoirs of Soviet military officers. First off, it is useful to disembarrass ourselves of the twin myths that Romania never considered leaving the Warsaw Pact and that the Soviet Union would not have been bothered had they done so. However, even if the communist regime in Romania had been fully committed to the alliance throughout the Cold War, it would have mattered not at all if Moscow believed it was contemplating departure, especially if Moscow assessed such a departure as seriously undermining Soviet security. In interstate relations, as in politics everywhere, perception is everything. (To quote Marx “The secret of life is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake that, you’ve got it made.” – that’s Groucho Marx, by the way).
Romanian military interest in leaving the alliance appears in CIA and State Department reporting from November 1964 and in reporting from within the Pact that summer, including Khrushchev’s declaration to Czechoslovak Party leader Novotny that “The Balkans would become uncontrollable if Romania moved into the anti-Soviet camp. [We must] stop Romania leaving the Pact.” [Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You). We have the Polish transcript of the Pact’s Budapest meeting – plus Yugoslavia and minus Romania – in June 1967 where Brezhnev stated, after Romania refused its territory and airspace for the transport of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military assistance to its client states during the 6-Day War, that  “everything indicates they intend to break relations with our camp” and announce their “departure from the Warsaw Pact.” (Available at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113622.) We have Soviet Defense Minister Grechko stating to the Politburo that Romania is seriously considering “full withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact” and that the Pact “could not withstand this loss.” (Czech archive document cited in Matthew Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Policy)
To my mind, the clearest expression of actual Soviet-Romanian military relations is that given by the former chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, General Anatoly Gribkov, in his 1998 memoir. Again, unfortunately, I was unaware of its existence at the time I published With Friends Like These, so this is not included in that volume. It is, however, well worth considering:
The Romanians were concerned they would share the fate of Czechoslovakia. So they adopted a doctrine of “defense of the entire people.” Gradually and secretly they redeployed their troops. The best-equipped and most combat capable divisions were deployed close to the Soviet border and to the Iron Gates, and close to the border with Bulgaria. Later the Hungarian front was strengthened – the contested territory of Transylvania. They deployed anti-aircraft batteries with combat charges, at all airports, including the capital, for destruction of aircraft and airborne troops. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces did not have the right to land at Romanian airports or to fly across its territory to Bulgaria without written permission from the Romanian authorities. When a [Soviet] aircraft approached Romania - it was as if it was about to be put under enemy fire. All of Romanian became an armed camp. In technical schools and standard schools students in the higher grades intensively studies military affairs. There as no fulfillment of operational plans worked out previously and no fulfillment of plans for the event of a NATO attack—although this was plainly necessary. Fundamental changes were introduced into the plans for the purchasing of armament; the Romanians only procured basically defensive systems for anti-aircraft, for interceptor aircraft, communications equipment and anti-tank weapons.”